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COMMENT
COLORADO'S AMENDMENT 2 DEFEATED: THE
EMERGENCE OF A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS*
INTRODUCTION
Homosexuals have been a target for prejudice and discrimination
in society and the political structure. Upon exposure of their sexual
orientation to the "outside" world, they face possible criminalization
for their sexual conduct,' discharge from or non-entry to the mili-
tary,2 and discharge from and discrimination in employment.' Ho-
* Thanks to my parents for their love and support, and to my good friend Laura Nelson for her
many hours of typing.
1. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1975) ("A person commits the crime of sexual
misconduct if [hie or [sihe engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person ....");
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1987) (prohibiting sodomy); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505
(1988 & Supp. 1993) ("Criminal sodomy is [s]odomy between persons who are 16 or more years
of age and members of the same sex .. "); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1990) ("A person is guilty of sodomy in the fourth degree when he engages in deviate
sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex."). This section was found to violate the
constitution of Kentucky in Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W;2d 487 (Ky. 1992). See also MD.
CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW ART, 27, § 554 (1954) (categorizing homosexual acts as "[u]nnatural or
perverted sexual practices"); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.158 (West 1991) (characterizing
sodomy as a "crime against nature"); MINN. STAT. § 609,293 (1992) (prohibiting sodomy); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1987) (prohibiting consensual sodomy); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 886 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993) (characterizing homosexual acts as "crimes against na-
ture"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-2 (1988 & Supp. 1993) (prohibiting sodomy); see
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that criminalization of homosexuals sex under
Georgia sodomy law was constitutional).
2. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding army regulation which
made homosexuality or admitted homosexuality nonwaivable disqualification for service), cert. de-
nied sub nora. Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388,
1398 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (permitting mandatory discharge for homosexual conduct under navy pol-
icy); Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 16 (D.D.C. 1991) (upholding Navy regulations prohibit-
ing those with homosexual orientation from serving in the Navy or attending the Naval Acad-
emy), affd sub noam. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994). But see Watkins v. United
States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1989) (prohibiting army from barring soldier's reenlist-
ment solely because of his acknowledged homosexuality), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); Dahl
v. Secretary of the U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1327 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (enjoining Navy from
taking any adverse action against plaintiff by reason of his homosexual status or on account of his
statements of his sexual orientation).
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mosexual relationships have also received disparate treatment in
rights afforded a heterosexual relationship, such as the right to mar-
riage," and the obtaining of a spouse's health benefits,' health insur-
ance coverage, 6 or inheritance.7 Homosexuals have unsuccessfully
raised these issues as a denial of equal protection. However, with
Evans v. Romer,9 there is hope for protection against certain types
of homosexual discrimination 10 because the Colorado Supreme
Court refused to allow the majority of Colorado voters to eliminate
existing laws and policies prohibiting discrimination based on an in-
dividual's sexual orientation.
In Evans, the Colorado Supreme Court declared that homosexu-
als have a fundamental right to participate on an equal basis in the
political process. 1 However, this right was not limited to homosexu-
als; it extended to all classes of people.1 2 This fundamental right
concept was developed through the Fourteenth Amendment of the
3. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 448 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding
firing of high school guidance counselor because she revealed her sexual preference), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1009 (1985); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979)
(finding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting "sex" discrimination only ap-
plies to gender discrimination and does not include sexual preference such as homosexuality);
Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Wash.) (upholding discharge of
teacher because he was a known homosexual), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
4. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 48 (Haw. 1993) (finding that the Hawaii Constitution did
not give rise to a fundamental right of persons of the same sex to marry).
5. See Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121, 122-23 (Wis. Ct. App.
1992) (upholding the denial of a state employee's application for family health insurance coverage
for her lesbian companion).
6. See Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 418 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) (upholding the denial of dental care benefits for homosexual state employees).
7. See In re Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 131 (N.Y. App. Div.) (finding that the survivor of a
homosexual relationship alleged to be a "spousal relationship" was not entitled to the right of
election against decedent's will), appeal dismissed, 82 N.Y.2d 801 (1993).
8. See supra notes 3-7 (noting cases in which claims based on equal protection brought by
homosexuals have failed).
9. 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
10. In fact, four months after the Colorado Supreme Court decided Evans v. Romer, the
United States District Court preliminarily enjoined a similar measure to Amendment 2 which the
voters in Cincinnati, Ohio passed. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincin-
nati, 838 F. Supp. 1235, 1238 (S.D. Ohio 1993). The court in that case recognized the Colorado
Supreme Court's invalidating Amendment 2 based on its infringement with a fundamental right
to participate equally in the political process. Id. at 1239. Following the Evans court's analysis,
the United States District Court found that the measure at issue in that case infringed on homo-
sexuals' fundamental right to participate equally in the political process, as well as on first amend-
ment rights. Id. The district court then issued a permanent injunction in 1994. Equality Found. of
Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
11. 854 P.2d at 1285.
12. Id. at 1284.
1995] COLORADO'S AMENDMENT TWO DEFEATED 843
United States Constitution which guarantees every United States
Citizen the right to equal protection of the laws.' 3 The case evolved
when voters in Colorado passed an amendment to the state Consti-
tution which eliminated and forbade any laws that protected homo-
sexuals from discrimination. 14 When amendment opponents filed
suit declaring the amendment unconstitutional, the Colorado Su-
preme Court affirmed the issuance of a preliminary injunction, thus
enjoining state officials from enforcing the amendment.' 5
This Note examines the underlying analysis used by the Colorado
Supreme Court to develop a fundamental right for homosexuals to
participate equally in the political process.' 6 The Background sec-
tion explores the history behind the creation and enactment of the
Colorado amendment, the campaign literature, the impact of the
amendment after it was voted on, as well as proponent and opponent
arguments concerning the amendment.' Next the Background ex-
amines the history of gays' struggle for equal rights.' 8 The Back-
ground concludes with an overview of equal protection analysis and
the development of a fundamental right, particularly as it pertains
to political participation.' 9
The Section regarding the Subject Opinion, Evans v. Romer,2 °
first discusses the arguments proposed by the Colorado amendment
13. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. 854 P.2d at 1272.
15. On September 17, 1993, Attorney General Gale Norton, counsel for the amendment, made
her formal bid to take the case to the United States Supreme Court. Steven Wilmsen, High Court
Asked to OK Amend. 2, DENVER POST, Sept. 18, 1993, at IA. On November 1, 1993, the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari. The trial on the constitutionality of the amendment oc-
curred in October of 1993 in Denver District Court. District Court Judge Bayless ruled the
amendment unconstitutional on December 14, 1993. Evans v. Romer, No. CIV.A.92-CV-7223,
1993 WL 518586 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993). Judge Bayless relied on the guidelines set forth
by the Colorado Supreme Court in Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 419 (1993). In October of 1994, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
ruling the amendment unconstitutional. Evans v. Romer, Nos. 94SA48, 94SAI28, 1994 WL
554621 (Colo. Oct. 11, 1994).
16. See infra notes 270-371 and accompanying text (discussing the legal doctrine relied upon
by the Colorado Supreme Court in finding a fundamental right for homosexuals to participate
equally in the political process).
17. See infra notes 27-115 and accompanying text (discussing the amendment and its impact
after it was voted on).
18. See infra notes 116-39 and accompanying text (providing a historical analysis of claims
brought by homosexuals).
19. See infra notes 140-235 and accompanying text (detailing how the fundamental right to
equal political participation is developed through the equal protection clause).
20. 854 P.2d 1270, 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
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opponents, the plaintiffs, before the trial court. 1 Next is a detailed
discussion of prior case law the Colorado court utilized to develop
its fundamental right to equal participation in the political process.2
The focus of the majority opinion centers on cases concerning the
right to vote, reapportionment, candidate eligibility, and voter initi-
ated amendments preventing enactment of particular desired legisla-
tion. Next the dissenting opinion and the arguments upon which it
relies are examined. 23
The Analysis begins by rehabilitating the majority's stance in its
fundamental right development and combating the arguments
presented by the dissent. 24 The Analysis further justifies the major-
ity's analysis by advancing the position that political participation is
fundamental for all classes of persons, not just those deemed "sus-
pect."'25 The section concerning the impact of the Colorado court's
holding discusses first, the extension of the fundamental right "list,"
second, the safeguarding of the political process, and last, the hope
for the future the right encompasses for homosexuals."
I. BACKGROUND
In May of 1992, the requisite number of Colorado voters submit-
ted a proposed amendment to the Colorado Constitution. 21 On No-
vember 3, 1992, Colorado voters approved the proposal, referred to
as "Amendment 2," by a vote of 813,966 to 710,151 (53.4% to
46.6%).28 Amendment 2 provided:
NO PROTECTED STATUS BASED ON HOMOSEXUAL, LESBIAN,
OR BISEXUAL ORIENTATION. Neither the State of Colorado, through
any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivi-
sions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
21. See infra notes 240-56 and accompanying text (addressing the plaintiffs' arguments).
22. See infra notes 270-371 and accompanying text (discussing prior case law the Colorado
court relied on in developing its fundamental right).
23. See infra notes 372-426 and accompanying text (addressing the arguments proposed by the
dissent).
24. See infra notes 427-86 and accompanying text (arguing that the majority was correct in
relying on prior U.S. Supreme Court precedent to develop a fundamental right to political
participation).
25. See infra notes 487-524 and accompanying text (supporting the majority's position that
everyone, not just those belonging to a "suspect" class, are entitled to protection when their right
to participate in the political process in restricted).
26. See infra notes 525-41 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the holding in
Evans).
27. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
28. Id.
[Vol. 44:841
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statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bi-
sexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or oth-
erwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or
claim any minority status quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-
executing."9
The amendment made unenforceable and unconstitutional, all Colo-
rado laws, regulations, ordinances, and policies which prohibited dis-
crimination based on an individual's sexual orientation.30
On November 12, 1992, the plaintiffs 1 instituted an action to
have Amendment 2 declared unconstitutional on its face, and to en-
join its enforcement.32 All the individually named plaintiffs, Colo-
rado residents, were homosexual men and lesbians, except for one
heterosexual man suffering from Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome (AIDS). 3" Generally, plaintiffs argued that Amendment 2 vi-
olated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
as well as other state and federal constitutional provisions, by con-
signing "gay men, lesbians and bisexuals to a second class
citizenship."
Defendants,3" the Governor and Attorney General of Colorado,
argued that Amendment 2, on its face, did not infringe on any con-
stitutional rights, approve or further discrimination, or prevent dis-
29. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AN ANALYSIS OF 1992
BALLOT PROPOSALS 9 (Research Pub. No. 369, 1992) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL].
30. Id. For examples of legislation that Amendment 2 made unenforceable, see infra notes 88-
99 and accompanying text.
31. Richard G. Evans (a gay man employed by the City and County of Denver); Angela Ro-
mero (a lesbian employed as a police officer of the City and County of Denver); Linda Fowler (a
lesbian employed as a contract administrator by a private employer); Paul Brown (a gay man
employed by the State of Colorado); Jane Doe (assumed name of lesbian citizen employed by a
public entity in Jefferson County); Martina Navratilova (a lesbian professional tennis player resid-
ing in Aspen); Bret Tanberg (a heterosexual infected with the Human lmmunodeficiency virus
"HIV" and diagnosed as having "AIDS" and discriminated against based on a perception he is
gay); Priscilla lnkpen (lesbian ordained minister); John Miller (a gay man employed as a Spanish
Professor at the University of Colorado); the Boulder School District RE-2; The City and County
of Denver; the City of Boulder; the City of Aspen; and the City Council of Aspen. Amended
Complaint at 2-4, Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 19678 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15,
1993), afld on other grounds, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
32. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1272.
33. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9-12, Evans v. Romer,
1993 WL 19678 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 1993) (No. 92 CV 7223), aff'd on other grounds, 854
P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
34. Amended Complaint at 1, Evans (No. 92 CV 7223).
35. Governor of the state of Colorado, Roy Romer; Attorney General of the state of Colorado,
Gale A. Norton.
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crimination claims in lawsuits. 6 They further added that the
amendment "ha[d] only the intent and effect of establishing a state-
wide policy of governmental neutrality with respect to sexual orien-
tation," and "simply provide[d] that homosexual or bisexual orien-
tation should not be granted special protection such as the federally-
recognized categories of race, gender, religion, and national
origin."37
On January 15, 1993, the Colorado District Court issued a pre-
liminary injunction preventing state officials from enforcing the
amendment.3 On July 19, 1993, the Colorado Supreme Court af-
firmed the District Court's issuance of the preliminary injunction
and held that the amendment infringed on plaintiffs' fundamental
right to participate equally in the political process.3 9 In order to un-
derstand the Colorado court's rationale in finding such a fundamen-
tal right, it is helpful to know the history behind the enactment of
Amendment 2.
A. Origination of and Beliefs Behind Amendment 2
Amendment 2 arose during an era involving increased govern-
mental activity in the area of civil rights. Congress and the states
extended the concepts of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 0 to
prohibit discrimination in employment, 1 public education,'4 2 and ac-
cess to public accommodations. 43 Amendment 2 prohibited Colo-
rado's state and local governments from enacting or enforcing civil
rights laws and policies concerning the issue of discrimination based
on a homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual's orientation, conduct, prac-
tice, or relationship.'4
Colorado for Family Values ("CFV"), a non-profit corporation
based in Colorado Springs, drafted and campaigned for Amendment
36. Motion to Dismiss at 1, Evans v. Romer, 1993 WL 19678 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 1993)
(No. 92 CV 7223), aff'd on other grounds, Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
37. Id. at 2.
38. 1993 WL 19678 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 1993).
39. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993). The Colorado Supreme court ruled the
amendment unconstitutional in Evans v. Romer, Nos. 94SA48, 94SA128, 1994 WL 554621
(Colo. Oct. 11, 1994).
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(a)-(h) (West 1993).
41. Id. § 2000(e).
42. Id. § 2000(c).
43. Id. § 2000(a).
44. For the text of Amendment 2, see supra text accompanying note 29.
[Vol. 44:841
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2."' The National Legal Foundation, an organization founded by
Reverend Pat Robertson, assisted CFV in drafting the amend-
ment."' CFV was formed in 1991 in response to the enactment of a
local ordinance protecting individuals from certain types of discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation.47 Their mission was to "pro-ac-
tively lead and assist those opposing the militant homosexual attack
on traditional values;" to preserve "the fundamental freedoms of
speech, association, assembly, belief and conscience" and to "pre-
serve the right to disagree with and resist, in a civil and compassion-
ate manner, the forced affirmation of the homosexual lifestyle." '
CFV developed its campaign theme of "no special rights for
homosexuals" with assistance from the "religious right," a composi-
tion of national organizations." The 'religious right' adheres to con-
servative religious and political beliefs which include staunch anti-
communism, a prominent place within society for church and fam-
ily, and a traditional role within the family for the husband, wife
and children. ° CFV advanced numerous arguments through its
campaign literature to support its views. The following section ex-
plores these arguments.
45. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, Evans v. Romer,
1993 WL 19678 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 1993) (No. 92 CV 7223), afd on other grounds, Evans
v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
46. Id. at 4.
47. COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES. AMENDMENT 2 & BEYOND (1993) [hereinafter CFV].
The ordinance protected individuals from discrimination in employment, housing, educational in-
stitutions, real estate transactions, public accommodations, and health and welfare service on the
basis of their sexual orientation. DENVER. COLO., REV. MUN. CODE art. IV, § 28-91 to -116
(1991).
48. CFV, supra note 47. The entire mission statement read:
The mission of COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES is to pro-actively lead and
assist those opposing the militant homosexual attack on traditional values; to act as a
resource equipping grass-roots efforts through education and training of like-minded
organizations and individuals across America dedicated to preserving the fundamental
freedoms of speech, association, assembly, belief and conscience protected by Colo-
rado's Amendment Two; to preserve the right to disagree with and resist, in a civil
and compassionate manner, the forced affirmation of the homosexual lifestyle.
id.
49. Plaintiffs-Appellees' Answer Brief at 10, Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.) (No.
93SA17), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993) (Letter from the National Legal Foundation to
CFV) (on file with the Plaintiffs-Appellees). CFV denied being a "religious fundamentalist" or-
ganization. CFV, supra note 47. Instead, CFV stated its position as not based on religious views,
but "rather on a concern for fairness and true civil rights." id.
50. Plaintiffs-Appellees' Answer Brief at 10 n.9, Evans (No. 93SA17). The California-based
Traditional Values Coalition led by the Reverend Louis Sheldon developed the "no special rights"
theme in 1989 and 1990. Id.
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1. CFV's "Social" Arguments to Support Amendment 2
To support its anti-homosexual rights view, CFV filed materials
with the Legislative Council and campaign brochures which de-
scribed the purposes of Amendment 2. These purposes were desig-
nated as: protecting "traditional family values and structures," safe-
guarding children from sexual molestation, protecting "individuals'
rights to view homosexuality as immoral," preventing dissolution of
civil rights protection for "authentic minorities," diminishing the
cost for treatment of AIDS and its "deadly consequences," and fur-
thering the view that homosexuality is curable.51
To support these purposes, CFV maintained that gays and lesbi-
ans "threaten[ed] . . . to undermine traditional family values and
structures" because if homosexuals were allowed to marry, the
traditional family structure would dissolve, insurance rates increase,
and children, as "wretched victims of 'such marriages,' would be-
come miserable."52 CFV further asserted that homosexuals were
"notorious practitioners of sex with minors '53 and that they were
society's link to sexually transmitted diseases.54 According to CFV,
by 1995, AIDS-infected homosexuals would overcrowd hospitals, re-
sulting in fewer hospital beds for others in need of medical aid. 55
CFV proposed a "deeper purpose" as "bringing a message of
hope to individuals who . . . have chosen to go down a wrong
road." 56 They argued that "homosexual practices [were] misguided
efforts to fill love needs not provided for in early childhood by same-
gender parents. 5 7 CFV also believed that homosexuality was a be-
havior which could be changed.58
51. Id. at 10-11 (quoting CFV's campaign material).
52. Id. at 11.
53. Id. CFV asserted in its campaign propaganda that homosexuals were responsible for the
majority of child molestation, arguing that they were responsible for one third of the population's
molestation reports. DR. PAUL CAMERON, FAMILY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC., CHILD MOLESTA-
TION AND HOMOSEXUALITY para. 17 (1993).
54. Plaintiffs-Appellees' Answer Brief at I1, Evans (No. 93SA17).
55. Id. at 12.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. To support this proposition, CFV argued that 1) there has been no "provable" evidence
of "biological or genetic differences between heterosexuals and homosexuals" that were not caused
by behavior; 2) "sexual desires and behavior" were learned; 3) homosexuality was "handed down"
by adults to children; 4) "early homosexual experiences influence[d] adult patterns of behavior;"
5) religion and other cultural factors influenced sexual conduct; 6) men and women shifted their
sexual preferences; and 7) "there [were] many ex-homosexuals." DR. PAUL CAMERON, FAMILY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE. INC., WHAT CAUSES HOMOSEXUAL DESIRE AND CAN IT BE CHANGED?
[Vol. 44:841
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CFV further asserted that the government should not become in-
volved by imposing values in this area of public controversy.59 For
CFV, Amendment 2 was created only to prevent homosexuals from
qualifying for quota preferences, filing discrimination claims, or ob-
taining minority status based on their sexual preference. 60 They
maintained that history granted these rights only to ethnic minori-
ties suffering "clear, systematic discrimination and economic disad-
vantage."'" That is why, CFV concluded, Amendment 2 did not
deny homosexuals any civil rights.62 It was against this backdrop of
belief that the amendment was proposed, campaigned, and passed.6 a
The arguments proposed by CFV were attacked by numerous oppo-
nents of Amendment 2. These counter-arguments are discussed
next.
2. Amendment 2 Opponents Counter-Arguments
Opponents of Amendment 2 consisted of a wide variety of groups.
Amicus briefs in opposition to the amendment were submitted to the
Colorado Supreme Court by the National Education Association,
the AIDS Action Council, the Colorado Bar Association, and the
Coalition of Associations of Mental Health Professionals.64 These
(1992).
59. Howard Pankratz, Initiative Awaits its Day in Court, DENVER POST, Sept. 19, 1993, at 8D.
They argued that Amendment 2 ensured that government would not interfere with a private citi-
zen's choice to associate with homosexuals and bisexuals. Id. In support of the amendment, the
Attorney General also stated that Amendment 2 "wasn't intended to deprive gays and lesbians of
constitutionally guaranteed rights, but was designed to remove 'state-based grounds' for putting
homosexuals in a more favorable position than other citizens." Id.
60. CFV, supra note 47.
61. Id. In its campaign propaganda, CFV argued that Amendment 2 protected Colorado's
"true minorities." CFV. How VOTING "YES!" ON AMENDMENT 2 PROTECTS COLORADO'S TRUE
MINORITIES (1992). CFV stated that "true minority rights [were] under attack-by a few people
who [thought] civil rights [did not] have to be based on need . . . just how they [had] sex!" Id. at
para. 1.
62. Id.
63. Opponents of Amendment 2 argued that the CFV's campaign propaganda clouded the issue
in such a way that voters did not know for what they were voting. Jean Torkelson, On the March
Amendment 2 Foes Lost Election, But They Vow to Still Win the War, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
Nov. 15, 1992, at 160. For example, after a debate with Amendment 2 advocates prior to the
election, campaign manager, Joseph Marione, stated that numerous people came up to them and
said "You know, when we walked in here we were all set to vote yes on [Amendment] 2 because
we don't believe in special rights. But now we know this is really an issue of discrimination and we
really appreciate your clarifying it for us." Id.
64. Other amicus briefs in opposition to Amendment 2 were submitted by the American Feder-
ation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, and a combined brief by the Ameri-
can Jewish Committee, United Church of Christ Office for Church in Society, Union of American
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opponents, along with plaintiffs, countered CFV's beliefs by arguing
that sexual orientation was not chosen,6" and homosexuals should
not be required to adopt a heterosexual orientation any more than
should a heterosexual be required to change his or her sexual orien-
tation.66 Furthermore, they argued that homosexuality did not im-
pair "judgment, stability, reliability or general social or vocational
capabilities. '6 7 They pointed out that the American Psychological
Association asked its members to remove the "stigma of mental ill-
ness" associated with homosexuality.6 8
To counter other "myths" laid out by CFV, such as the gay child
molester proposition, Amendment 2 opponents argued that accord-
ing to studies, neither heterosexual men nor gay men were more
likely than the other to commit acts of child molestation.69 They
also rejected the "traditional family structure disintegration" argu-
ment by stating that children who live with both the mother and her
lesbian companion, have "a richer, more open and stable family
life" than do children raised solely by the lesbian mother.70 As for
the proponents' "public health" argument, opponents argued that
public health is hindered by discrimination against homosexuals be-
Hebrew Congregations, and the Anti-Defamation League. Amicus briefs in support of Amend-
ment 2 were submitted by CFV and the Institute in Basic Life Principles.
65. Brief Amicus Curiae of Coalition of Associations of Mental Health Professionals at 4, Ev-
ans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.) (No. 93SA17) (relying on a study of gay male, lesbian, and
bisexual twins in Bailey, Pillord et al., Heritable Factors Influence Sexual Orientation in Women,
50 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 217 (Mar. 1993); Bailey & Benishay, Familial Aggregation of Fe-
male Sexual Orientation, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 272 (1993); Bailey & Pillard, A Genetic Study
of Male Sexual Orientation, 48 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1089 (1991), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
419 (1993).
66. Brief Amicus Curiae of Coalition of Associations of Mental Health Professionals at 6, Ev-
ans (No. 93SA17).
67. Id. (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, RESOLUTION (Dec. 15, 1973)).
68. Id. at 25 (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY ASSOCIATION, RESOLUTION (Jan. 1975)).
69. Id. at 23 (referring to Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's
Guide to Social Science Research, I LAW & SEXUALITY 133, 156 (1991)). In its amicus brief, the
mental health professionals argued that "[c]hild sexual molestation, pedophilia, [did] not relate to
sexual orientation, any more than heterosexual rape [was] related to heterosexuality." Id. It
pointed out that early studies on the sexual orientation of child molesters were problematic be-
cause a molestation was labeled 'homosexual' if the perpetrator and victim were of the same
biological sex, regardless of the perpetrator's sexual orientation. Id. Further, they indicated that
researchers found that "homosexuals [were] less likely to be aroused by children of their own
gender than [were] heterosexuals by children of the opposite gender." Id. at 24 (referring to A. N.
Groth & H. J. Birnbaum, Adult Sexual Orientation and Attraction to Underage Persons, 7
ARCH. SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 175 (1978); K. Freund, R. Langevin et al., Heterosexual Aversion in
Homosexual Males, 122 BRIT, J. PSYCHIATRY 163, 165 (1973)).
70. Id. at 27 (quoting Roy Kirkpatrick, Clinical Implications of Lesbian Mother Studies, in
INTEGRATED IDENTITY 201, 204 (Coleman ed., 1987)).
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cause it forces homosexuals to falsify or suppress important infor-
mation as well as obstruct efforts in public education. 7 They
pointed out that researchers found that societies which punish ho-
mosexual conduct "suffer from poorer reporting and treatment of
sexually transmitted diseases among lesbians and gay men than
more progressive societies."72 Furthermore, HIV infections are ap-
pearing at a faster rate among heterosexuals than new infections are
in gay men.73 Thus, by attacking CFV's alleged statistics and facts,
Amendment 2 opponents furthered the belief that homosexuals were
entitled to equal protection of the laws. The debate regarding homo-
sexual rights continued, perhaps to a larger degree, after Colorado
voters passed the amendment. The effect of the passage of Amend-
ment 2 on Colorado, the citizens, the law, and nationwide, is dis-
cussed next.
B. Impact of the Amendment
After the amendment was passed, a boycott of Colorado occurred,
designed to promptly repeal the amendment and "make voters in
other states think twice before passing similar measures. 74 The
boycott successfully persuaded major convention groups to cancel
meetings in Denver. 75 Those heading the boycott claimed the state
of Colorado lost at least $120 million in business due to their efforts;
however, this figure included an unproven decline in tourism.78
Despite this negative reaction, Amendment 2 influenced the pro-
posal of similar ballot initiatives for 1994 in Arizona, California,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, and Washington. 7 Furthermore, in
all fifty states, plans developed to instigate anti-gay rights laws. 78
Gay-rights activists also engaged in their own strategies. The Na-
tional Gay and Lesbian Task Force spread throughout the United
71. Brief Amici Curiae of AIDS Action Council, et al. at 12, Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270
(Colo.) (No. 93SA17), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
72. Id. (taken from D. G. Ostrow & N. L. Altman, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Homo-
sexuality, 10 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 208, 212 (1983)).
73. Id. at 18-19 (referring to A. Greenspan & K. Castro, Heterosexual Transmission of HIV
Infection, 19 SEICUS REP. No. 1, at 1 (1990)).
74. Fred Brown, Politicians Steer Clear of Issue, DENVER POST, Sept. 19, 1993, at 12D.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Michael Booth & Steven Wilmsen, The Great Divide: Basic Values at Heart of Debate,
DENVER POST, Sept. 19, 1993, at ID.
78. Id.
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States and initiated local campaigns availing "media saturation,
'coming-out parties,' education drives, and grassroots political or-
ganization." 79 Their goal was to stifle anti-gay movements before
they gained support and to 'encourage local governments to adopt
gay-rights laws. 80 They supported gay-rights legislation in New
Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, and West Virginia.8
Homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals, themselves, felt the impact
of the amendment. After the passage of Amendment 2, gay rights
activists found an increase in hate crimes toward homosexuals. 82
Leaders of the Gay and Lesbian Community Center83 of Colorado
reported that they received forty-five reports of "bias incidents"
against gays from November 1, 1992, to December 23, 1992, the
time period immediately following passage of the amendment, rep-
resenting almost four times more than during other months in
1992.84 The "incidents" ranged from verbal harassment to murder.8"
They further stated that homosexual hate crimes more than quadru-
pled in January through March of 1993, as compared to the same
period in 1992.88 When the Gay and Lesbian Community Center
released its results, San Francisco forbade official travel to Colo-




82. See Ann Carahan, Gay Leaders: Stats Show Amendment 2 Fuels Violence But Denver
Cops Cite No Major Hike in Bias Crimes, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 12, 1993, at 12 (homosex-
ual leaders cite statistics of post Amendment 2 anti-homosexual crimes and incidents reported);
Ann Carahan & John Brinkley, Hate Crimes Increasing, Gay Activists Say but Police Say
There's No Evidence That Assaults are up Since Amendment 2 Vote, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Dec.
23, 1992, at 6 (activists reporting increased hate crimes against gays while police question validity
of activists' supporting statistics); Thaddeus Herrick, Anti-Gay Hate Crimes Double in Denver,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 30, 1993, at 10A (Denver police reported twice the anti-gay hate
crimes than the prior quarter. Gay and lesbian leaders identify Amendment 2 as the main catalyst
of this increase.). However, Denver police did not find any significant increase in assaults on gays
after the election. Carahan & Brinkley, supra, at 6.
83. The Gay and Lesbian Community Center collects data on hate crimes against homosexuals.
Herrick, supra note 82, at 10A.
84. Carahan & Brinkley, supra note 82, at 6. Police said that they could not confirm these
figures because they did not categorize crimes according to the victim's or perpetrator's sexual
orientation. Id. The Executive Director for the Community Center said the Center received 189
reports of violence against homosexuals in 1992 compared to 89 in 1991 (as of December 23,
1992). Id.
85. Id. The Center reported five "gay-related" murders in 1992 compared to two in 1991. Id.
However, police stated that most or all of these murders were committed by gays. Id.
86. Herrick, supra note 82, at 10A. Denver police reported an increase only in hate crimes
between January and March of 1993, in which 9 were reported, as compared to the same period
in 1992, in which 4 were reported. Id.
[Vol. 44:841
1995] COLORADO'S AMENDMENT TWO DEFEATED 853
would no longer hold meetings or events in Colorado. 87 The immedi-
ate impact of Amendment 2 appeared to be widespread.
Not only did Amendment 2 affect the community and livelihood
of Colorado, it also affected existing legislation. Passage of Amend-
ment 2 made existing ordinances that prohibited discrimination
based on sexual orientation with regard to homosexual, lesbian, and
bisexual persons unenforceable and unconstitutional.88 When the
amendment was passed, there were local ordinances, state laws and
policies in Colorado, other states and municipalities, and in higher
education institutions that offered limited protection against, or pro-
hibited discrimination based on sexual orientation. 89 There were no
federal civil rights laws protecting persons from discrimination
based on sexual orientation in the areas of housing, employment, or
public accommodations.90 However, the federal Hate Crime Statis-
tics Act of 19901 required the United States' Attorney General to
monitor, in addition to other crimes, those crimes that manifested
evidence of prejudice based on sexual orientation.9
Three Colorado local ordinances protect individuals from discrim-
ination based solely on sexual orientation in the areas of employ-
ment, housing, and public accommodations. 93 None of the ordi-
nances require quotas, affirmative action, minority status or require
87. Carahan & Brinkley, supra note 82, at 10A.
88. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL. supra note 29, at 10.
89. See infra notes 93-111 and accompanying text (discussing these other laws and policies
preventing discrimination against sexual orientation).
90. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(a)-(h) (West 1993) (preventing discrim-
ination based on color, gender, race, national origin, and religion).
91. Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, §§ 1, 2, 104 Stat. 140 (1990) (set as a
note under 28 U.S.C.A. § 534).
92. Id.
93. Aspen's ordinance prohibited discrimination in the areas of employment, housing, and pub-
lic accommodations because of race, creed, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, sex, age, mar-
ital or familial status, physical handicap, sexual orientation, or political affiliation. ASPEN, COLO..
MUN. CODE § 13-98 (1977). The Aspen ordinance did not exempt religious institutions. Id. In
Boulder, religious institutions could not refuse to hire an individual or restrict access to public
accommodations or housing because of that person's race, creed, color, gender, sexual orientation,
marital or familial status, pregnancy, national origin, ancestry, age, or mental or physical disabil-
ity. BOULDER. COLO., REV. CODE § 12-1-2 to -4 (1987). Also, the Boulder ordinance did not
permit the owner of an owner-occupied, one-family dwelling or duplex to deny housing to an
individual based on his or her sexual orientation. Id. However, the ordinance did allow owners to
limit renters or lessees to persons of the same sex. Id. The Denver ordinance entirely exempted
religious institutions, thus allowing them to refuse to hire persons or restrict access to public ac-
commodations or housing based on a person's sexual orientation. DENVER. COLO.. REV. MUN.
CODE art. IV, § 28-91 to -116 (1991). It also exempted owners with rental spaces in their homes
or duplexes (in which they resided). Id.
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
that employers or landlords seek out homosexual, lesbian, or bisex-
ual employees or tenants. The anti-discrimination laws do not desig-
nate homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexuals as "ethnic minorities,"
rather, they prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.94
Thus, they also prohibit discrimination against heterosexuals.95 The
Denver Public Schools also adopted a policy prohibiting discrimina-
tion based on an individual's sexual orientation.96
As for state laws and policies, the Governor of Colorado issued an
executive order in 1990,97 prohibiting employment discrimination
(i.e. hiring, promotion, firing) based on the sexual orientation of
classified and exempt state employees. The order applied to primary
educational state institutions and to executive departments.98 The
only Colorado statute forbidding discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation prohibited health insurance companies from relying on an
individual's sexual orientation when determining insurability.99 The
Colorado Civil Rights Commission voted to recommend amending
the state's civil rights laws to include a prohibition against discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation. 00
Anti-discrimination laws and policies exist in other states besides
Colorado. Six states (Connecticut,' 0' Hawaii, 02 Massachusetts, 0 3
New Jersey, 04 Vermont, 0 5 Wisconsin 10 6) and the District of Co-
lumbia10 7, and approximately 110 cities and counties in 25 states
have enacted legislation in areas of employment, housing, and public
94. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL. supra note 29, at 10.
95. Id. Colorado Springs and Fort Collins defeated similar anti-discrimination ordinances. Id.
96. Id.
97. Exec. Order No. D0035 (Dec. 19, 1990).
98. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL. supra note 29, at 10. Metropolitan State College of Denver had a
policy which prohibited discrimination in membership in college sponsored social clubs on the
basis of a person's sexual orientation. Id. Colorado State University had a nondiscrimination pol-
icy which applied to everyone, not just sponsored social clubs. Id. On the other hand, the Colorado
Board of Regents declined to enact a resolution prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation. Id.
99. COLO. INS. CODE § 10-3-1104, 4A C.R.S. (Supp. 1994). In 1991, legislation failed which
would have extended Colorado's ethnic intimidation law to include protection against harassment
for everyone, regardless of age, handicap, disability, or sexual orientation. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.
supra note 29, at 10.
100, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 10.
101. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994).
102. HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (Supp. 1992).
103. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4, ch. 272, § 98 (West 1993).
104. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, -12 (West 1994 & Supp. 1994).
105. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502 (1993).
106. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 66.432, 111.36 (West 1993).
107. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 10.
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accommodations protecting homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals
from discrimination based on their sexual orientation.10 8 In Novem-
ber of 1992, the Oregon Court of Appeals struck down a statute
that permitted state officials to take a personnel action against an
employee on the basis of the employee's sexual orientation, thus re-
affirming the validity of its rules that expressly prohibit discrimina-
tion on that basis. 10 9
Governors in eight states (California, Minnesota, New Mexico,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington) is-
sued executive orders protecting state employees from discrimina-
tion in employment based on their sexual orientation.11 0 Also, nearly
sixty-five colleges and universities nationwide have issued non-dis-
crimination policies protecting heterosexual, homosexual, lesbian,
and bisexual persons.'
With the birth of such measures as Amendment 2, non-discrimi-
nation laws and policies regarding homosexuality are in jeopardy.
This type of initiative nullifies and voids anti-discrimination ordi-
nances and policies concerning homosexuals. Amendment 2 made
all existing anti-discrimination ordinances, laws, regulations, and
policies in Colorado prohibiting discrimination based on an individ-
ual's homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation unenforceable and
unconstitutional." 2 As demonstrated by the aforementioned school
policies, laws, and executive orders passed in other states, support
exists for gay rights in areas of employment, education, and public
accommodations. However, since Amendment 2 inspired drives for
similar ballot measures in other states," 3 the existence of anti-ho-
mosexual discrimination laws and policies remains vulnerable." 4
108. Id.
109. Merrick v. Board of Higher Educ., 841 P.2d 646 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). In 1988, Oregon
voters overturned an executive order that protected homosexuals from discrimination in state gov-
ernment. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 10. For a discussion of the Oregon situation as
of the end of 1993, see infra note 114.
110. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 10.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 9.
113. See supra text accompanying note 77 (listing the states inspired by Amendment 2).
114. Although Colorado was the first state to pass an anti-gay state constitutional amendment,
it was not the first to attempt to place such a measure on the state ballot. California and Oregon
both attempted to adopt by ballot a measure that repealed existing state legislation relating to
homosexual rights.
In California, citizens sought to place an anti-homosexual and acquired immune deficiency syn-
drome (AIDS) ordinance on the ballot. Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Ct., I Cal.
App. 4th 1013 (1991). The California Court of Appeals did not allow their proposed ordinance to
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In addition to the recent struggle homosexuals, lesbians, and
bisexuals experience in the states in attempting to uphold existing
anti-discrimination policies and legislation, this class of persons has
met resistance in the past as well. Homosexuals have used various
provisions of the federal Constitution in an attempt to be placed on
equal ground with everyone else. The court in Evans v. Romer,"' by
declaring the existence of a fundamental right to political participa-
tion, provided a means for homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals, to
have equal involvement in the governmental process. A discussion of
the history of gays' struggle for equal rights is useful to understand
the step the Evans court took to ensure that the democratic process
was accessible to all, in particular here, homosexuals, lesbians, and
bisexuals.
C. History of Gays' Struggle for Equal Rights
The history of the United States demonstrates that "when a de-
spised minority must fend for itself in the tumult of electoral and
legislative politics, the majority may deny it a fair chance." ' In the
summer of 1986, in Bowers v. Hardwick,17 the U.S. Supreme
Court clearly stated its position regarding homosexuality. The Court
declared that no fundamental privacy right attached to consensual
homosexual sodomy.' 8 Thus stood the breaking ground for a denial
of other rights as well.
Homosexuals fought for status and equal rights by challenging
policy and legislation through the First Amendment freedom of ex-
be presented on the ballot, stating that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 1026-27.
In Oregon, the debate concerned the exact wording of an anti-homosexual ballot title. However,
unlike the California court's outright refusal to place a similar measure on the ballot, the Oregon
Supreme Court, in 1993, certified a ballot title for a proposed initiative measure. Mabon v.
Keisling, 856 P.2d 1023 (Or. 1993).
Both the Oregon and California initiative were similar to Amendment 2. They prevented the
state government from creating classifications based on homosexuality and indirectly allowed dis-
crimination based on an individual's sexual orientation. These cases demonstrate the impact on
homosexual rights of a measure like Amendment 2. They further illustrate how other courts dealt
with the issue prior to having the measure placed on the ballot, where as the Colorado court was
not faced with the issue until after the amendment was already passed.
115. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
116. Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian,
and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 916 (1989).
117. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
118. Id.
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pression and association, 119 fundamental right to privacy, 120 and
equal protection clause. 2' However, the United States Supreme
Court held that homosexuals have no fundamental right to pri-
vacy 22 and the federal courts consistently hold that homosexuals
are neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect class, which would guaran-
tee them protection against discrimination. 23
For example, in Gay Students Organization of the University of
New Hampshire v. Bonner,124 gay students succeeded on a first
amendment right to association claim, allowing them to express
their beliefs on a college campus. In Bonner, a gay student's organi-
zation challenged the state university's prohibition against the or-
ganization's holding social functions on campus.' 25 The court found
that this prohibition denied the gay students their right to
association.' 21
119. See Gay Students Org. of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974) (prohib-
iting gay organization from social activities on campus denied members of organization their right
of association); Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980), (holding that gay male high
school student's taking male date to prom was "symbolic speech" protected by the first amend-
ment) vacated and remanded, 627 F.2d 1088 (1st Cir. 1981). But see Gay & Lesbian Students
Ass'n v. Gohn, 656 F. Supp. 1045 (W.D. Ark. 1987) (holding that the denial of funding to gay
and lesbian student's association did not unduly interfere with the association's right of free
speech and free association).
120. See Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the Navy policy of
mandatory discharge for homosexual conduct did not violate constitutional right to privacy); State
v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) (finding that there is no fundamental right to engage in
private consensual homosexuality). But see Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky.
1992) (invalidating a statute criminalizing private sexual relations between consenting adults of
the same sex because it violated state constitutional right to privacy); accord State v. Morales,
826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
121. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding against equal protec-
tion challenge an army regulation which made homosexuality or admitted homosexuality a
nonwaivable disqualification for service), cert. denied sub nom. Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 494 U.S.
1004 (1990); In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987) (upholding against equal
protection challenge a bill which excluded homosexuals as foster parent or adoptive parent). But
see Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that former Army Reserve Officer
stated an equal protection claim by alleging she was discharged based on her status as a homosex-
ual), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992).
122. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
123. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Ben-Shalom v.
Stone, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th
Cir. 1984), afJfd, 470 U.S. 903 (1985). But see Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543 (D. Kan.
1991 )(finding inherently suspect a government classification based on an individual's sexual orien-
tation), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992).
124. Gay Students Org. of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
125. Id.
126. Id.
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
However, in Gay and Lesbian Students Association v. Gohn, 27
an Arkansas court rejected homosexual students' claim of a right to
free speech and association. The court upheld a university's denial
of funding to a homosexual rights student organization. 28 The court
found that the denial of funding did not infringe on the organiza-
tion's right of free speech or right of free association because the
organization had equal access to campus facilities and communica-
tions, and it did not prevent the gay students from advocating their
views.1 29 The Arkansas court also found that the denial of funding
did not infringe on the organization's right to equal protection be-
cause it was "rationally related to a legitimate interest" in distribut-
ing a limited amount of funds in a manner beneficial to the entire
campus. 131
As for the right to privacy claim, overall, homosexuals have been
unsuccessful. The Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick' laid the
foundation for the inapplicability of this right to homosexual con-
duct by holding that homosexuals do not have a fundamental right
to engage in sodomy. Even consensual homosexual conduct occur-
ring in the privacy of one's own home was not protected. 132 Some
state courts, on the other hand, ignored Bowers and found that a
constitutional right to privacy existed for consenting homosexuals to
engage in private sexual relations. 133
Homosexuals have likewise struggled in the courts to gain equal
status with heterosexuals. For example, the Supreme Court of Ha-
waii recently affirmed the denial of marriage license applications to
homosexuals, finding no equal protection violation.3 4 The Hawaii
court held that homosexuals do not have a fundamental right to
127. Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 656 F. Supp. 1045 (W.D. Ark. 1987). Note that
this decision was decided a year after Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), while the Bonner
decision was twelve years prior to Bowers.
128. Id. at 1057.
129. Id. at 1056.
130. Id. at 1057.
131. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Supreme Court made no mention of whether heterosexuals were
also denied this right although the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy did not make a distinc-
tion between homosexuals and heterosexuals. "A person commits the offense of sodomy when he
performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or
anus of another .. " Id. at 188.
132. Id. at 195-96.
133. See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); State v. Morales, 826
S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
134. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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marry. 3 ' The Supreme Court of New Hampshire also found no
equal protection violation by a bill which excluded homosexuals as
foster parents or adoptive parents.136 A California court rejected an
equal protection challenge to the state's denial of dental care bene-
fits to partners of homosexual state employees.1 17 Overall, courts
have consistently rejected equal protection challenges by homosexu-
als, lesbians, and bisexuals.The Colorado Supreme Court turned the tide of a history of deny-
ing rights to homosexuals. The Evans court safeguarded existing
legislation protecting homosexuals from discrimination in areas of
housing, public accommodations, and employment 138 by preventing
Amendment 2 from repealing this legislation. In what could have
resulted in a denial of equal protection for homosexuals, lesbians,
and bisexuals, had the Evans court supported the amendment, re-
sulted in a statement that homosexuals deserve the right to equal
protection of the laws.
Through the fundamental right strand of the equal protection
clause, the Colorado Supreme Court has now provided a new consti-
tutional argument for this class of persons by holding that homosex-
uals, lesbians, and bisexuals have a fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process. 39 In order to understand how the
court developed this fundamental right, it is helpful to review how
the fundamental right and political participation concept developed.
D. Overview of Equal Protection Analysis
The equal protection clause has been called "'the single most im-
portant concept in the Constitution for the protection of individual
rights.' "140 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this
clause to protect suspect classifications such as women,' racial mi-
135. Id.
136. In Re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987).
137. Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1985). The court stated
that homosexual state employees were not unlawfully discriminated against because the Dental
Care Act at issue denied benefits to "unmarried partners of the state employees." Id. at 414. Cf
Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding the
denial of family health insurance coverage for a lesbian companion).
138. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (discussing the existing legislation protect-
ing homosexuals from discrimination).
139. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
140. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
121, 121 (1989).
141. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating federal law that automati-
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norities, 142 resident aliens,14 and illegitimate children 44 from dis-
criminatory treatment. The clause further prevents the government
from infringing on a fundamental right of any class of persons. The
clause also requires that all government classifications be rationally
related to legitimate purposes. 145 A description of what constitutes a
suspect class and a fundamental right under the equal protection
clause is helpful to understand the basis of the Colorado court's de-
cision in Evans, as the court did not recognize homosexuals as a
suspect class,'146 but provided an outlet for protection under the fun-
damental right strand.
1. Suspect Classifications
A suspect class is a group of individuals deserving special protec-
tion in our judicial system and political structure because they have
been subjected to a history of "purposeful, unjustified discrimina-
tion," and to "political powerlessness."' 47 Since such groups appear
unable to utilize normal political processes to change adverse legis-
lation, courts proceed more cautiously in reviewing relevant legisla-
tion to determine if its purpose is legitimate and is not simply a
cally granted benefits to spouse of male member of armed forces, but granted such benefits to
spouses of women in the armed forces only if she demonstrated his dependence on her for sup-
port); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating Idaho statute providing preference to males
for administering a decedent's estate). Gender is considered to be more of a quasi-suspect class
than a suspect class. Galloway, supra note 140, at 125. Gender-based classifications violate the
equal protection clause unless the government can show that the classification is "substantially
related to an important interest." Id.
142. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (invalidating city charter amendment that
prohibited city council from enacting any housing ordinance dealing with race, religion, or ances-
tral discrimination without voter approval); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (find-
ing racial segregation in schools a denial of equal protection).
143. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (finding no rational basis for a Texas statute that
denied education to children of illegal aliens); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (inval-
idating provisions of state welfare laws which imposed durational residency requirements on
aliens).
144. See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983) (holding that two-year statute of limitations on
proof of paternity for children born out of wedlock violated equal protection); Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973) (holding that the failure to provide support rights for children born out of
wedlock violated the equal protection clause). But see Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (finding
no equal protection violation with a New York statute that required illegitimate children who
would inherit from their fathers to provide proof of paternity). Illegitimacy is considered to be a
quasi-suspect class rather than a suspect class. Galloway, supra note 140, at 125.
145. Galloway, supra note 140, at 121.
146. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1275 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
147. Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating, Unwit-
tingly or Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 937, 938 (1991).
1995] COLORADO'S AMENDMENT TWO DEFEATED 861
discriminatory measure aimed at an unprotected minority.
148
The Supreme Court has articulated the relevant characteristics of
a suspect class as follows: a suspect class has suffered a long history
of discrimination; the class is "discrete, insular, and relatively pow-
erless politically;" it is defined by an immutable characteristic; and
is "defined by a stigmatizing characteristic that is generally irrele-
vant as a basis for legislation."' 49 For example, "classifications
based on race, ethnicity, nationality, and alienage are suspect."'
50
The Court has recently resisted the recognition of any new suspect
classes.' 5 ' This reluctance appears to originate from a belief that all
true suspect classes have been identified.' 52 Numerous courts con-
sistently reject homosexuals as constituting a suspect classifica-
tion. 153 The Evans court followed this pattern and restated the cur-
rent position that homosexuals do not qualify as a suspect class.' 5'
Since homosexuals were not a suspect class, the Colorado court
based its holding on the fundamental right strand of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
2. Fundamental Rights Generally
Fundamental rights are rights which the Court determines as
"having a value so essential to individual liberty in our society" that
they permit the Court to review acts of other government
branches.' 55 The test for determining whether a particular right is
fundamental is whether the right is "explicitly or implicitly guaran-
teed by the Constitution."' 5  For example, freedom of speech and
religion are fundamental rights because the first amendment explic-
itly protects them.157 Similar to rejecting an expansion of the list of
148. Id. (citing the decision in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938) wherein the Court discussed whether prejudice against particular minorities would require
judicial scrutiny due to possible failure in the political process).
149. Id. at 975.
150. Id. at 939 (citations omitted); Galloway, supra note 140, at 124.
151. Strasser, supra note 147, at 947.
152. Id.
153. See supra note 123 (listing cases which stated that homosexuals were not a suspect class).
154. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1275 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
155. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.7, at 388 (4th ed.
1991).
156. Galloway, supra note 140, at 148 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973)).
157. Id. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech ...." U.S. CONST amend. 1. Likewise,
the right of privacy is a fundamental right because the Supreme Court has implicitly upheld it as
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"suspect classes," the Supreme Court is also wary of expanding the
fundamental rights list, stating that it was unwilling to recognize a
new fundamental right "particularly if it require[d] redefining the
category of rights deemed to be fundamental."' 58
One of the most significant fundamental rights recognized by the
Supreme Court is the right to vote and to participate in the process
of government. 5 The right of citizens to participate in the govern-
mental process also involves the right to be represented in a republi-
can form of government and the right to petition the government for
redress of grievances.160 Actions which interfere with the exercise of
such fundamental rights by particular individuals or groups are sub-
ject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause.1"' In Evans,
such through the due process clauses. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking
down a statute which forbade the use of contraceptives because it violated a marital privacy right
found implicit in the Due Process Clause). The rights of interstate migration, Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and equal voting weight are also fundamental because they are implic-
itly protected by the Constitution. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (emphasizing the
"one man one vote"); see also 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.7, at 435 (2d ed. 1992) (stating there is a
fundamental right to have one's vote counted equally).
158. Strasser, supra note 147, at 954.
159. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (recognizing that the right to vote cannot
be diluted and that each citizen has a right to full and effective participation in the political
process).
160. Id.; see also Jarmel v. Putnam, 499 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1972) (holding that a three month
durational residency requirement for voting in non-presidential elections was unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
161. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (holding that when strict scrutiny applies, a
state's law violates the Equal Protection clause by interfering with the fundamental right to vote if
it favors traditional political parties over new parties); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (holding that
each person is entitled to a vote of equal value). Strict scrutiny is one of three standards of review
applied under the Equal Protection Clause. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432 (1985); 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.3, at 14-16 (2d ed. 1992). Besides strict scrutiny, there is
the rational basis test and intermediate scrutiny. Id.
Strict scrutiny is the harshest standard to meet to justify creating distinctions between one
group from another. Classifications based on race, ethnicity, and national origin violate the equal
protection clause unless the government can satisfy "strict scrutiny" by showing that the classifi-
cation is "necessary to further a compelling interest." See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I
(1967) (holding that classification based on race was subject to strict scrutiny test); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that national ancestry and ethnic origin deserved
strict scrutiny analysis). Even if the government demonstrates a compelling interest, the Court will
not uphold the classification unless the classification is necessary, or narrowly tailored, to promote
that interest. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 155, § 14.3. Courts apply this standard under the
equal protection clause when a suspect class or fundamental right is involved. Id. The application
of strict scrutiny recognizes that political choices hindering fundamental rights or embedding bias
against a minority group such as race, require special judicial inquiry "in order to preserve sub-
stantive values of equality and liberty." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 16-6 (2d ed. 1988).
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the Colorado Supreme Court found a fundamental right to partici-
pate equally in the political process.' 62 Therefore, the court applied
a strict scrutiny analysis and held that the defendants did not satisfy
a compelling interest justifying enforcement of Amendment 2.163 A
discussion of the fundamental right theory as it pertains to political
participation follows in the next section.
F. Development of Fundamental Rights Concerning the Right to
Political Participation
As recognized in the preceding section, fundamental rights are
"[t]hose rights which have their source, and are explicitly or implic-
itly guaranteed, in the federal Constitution . . . and state constitu-
tions."' 64 Legislative and administrative classifications that interfere
with fundamental rights are given strict scrutiny and will be held
unconstitutional absent a compelling interest justification.'6 5 Ine-
qualities directly infringing the access to, or levels of, a fundamental
right are particularly harmful when they interfere with voting and
litigating, "the two major sources of political and legal
legitimacy." '166
The right to participate in the political process in the context of
In order to satisfy the rational basis test, the governmental classification must be rationally
related to a government end not prohibited by the Constitution. 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra, at
14. Under this test, the law at issue is presumed constitutional and those challenging the law must
demonstrate that there is no rational relationship between the classification and the legislative
purpose. David M. Treiman, Equal Protection and Fundamental Rights - A Judicial Shell
Game, 15 TULSA L.J. 183 (1980). As long as the government has a rational basis for creating the
classification, the court will uphold the law. This standard of review has been applied to uphold
statutes requiring a retirement age, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979), and to uphold a school financing system based on
local property taxes, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
When the Supreme Court adopts an intermediate standard of review, less deference is given to
the classification at issue than under the rationality test; however, it is not as difficult a standard
for the government to meet as the strict scrutiny test. 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra, at 17.
Under the intermediate standard of review, the classification must have a "substantial relation-
ship" to an "important" government interest. Id. This standard has been applied in cases involving
gender, Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), illegitimacy, Lalli v. Lalli,
439 U.S. 259 (1978), alienage, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), and the mentally retarded,
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
162. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
163. Id. at 1286.
164. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (6th ed. 1990); see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (suggesting that fundamental rights must be explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the federal Constitution).
165. TRIBE, supra note 161, § 16-7, at 1454.
166. Id.
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voting has been held to be a "fundamental constitutional value" rec-
ognized as a "guise of liberty" under the due process clauses.' 67 Ap-
plication of this fundamental right protects classes such as race,
through the equal protection clause.' 68 Although by itself, the right
to political participation has not been held fundamental, a funda-
mental right to participate in the political process has evolved
through case law interpreting the Constitution in the context of vot-
ing, minority party rights, reapportionment, and measures prevent-
ing voters from enacting a particular type of legislation. A review of
Supreme Court decisions concerning these four categories is useful
to understand the Court's position on political participation.
1. Exercising the Right to Vote
The federal Constitution contains explicit provisions pertaining to
the right to vote. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits the states
from impairing the right to vote on the basis of a person's "race,
color, or previous condition of servitude."' 69 The Nineteenth
Amendment forbids discrimination in voting based on gender. 70
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment prevents states from imposing a
poll tax or any tax as a requirement to vote in a primary election or
other election for federal office.' The Twenty-Sixth Amendment
provides the right to vote for citizens eighteen years or older.' The
167. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89 (1965). This is not to be confused with the Evans court's analysis of a fundamental right to
political participation in the context of legislation which is directly adverse to a group and with
regard to the overall governmental process.
168. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (holding that state laws requiring potential vot-
ers to be a resident of that state for a year and a resident of the county for three months do not
further any compelling state interest and violate the equal protection clause); Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963) (ruling that a Constitutionally protected right to vote includes protection
against the dilution of citizen's votes); see, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (finding
that the equal protection clause protects every citizen's inalienable right to full and effective par-
ticipation in the political processes).
169. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S.
CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
170. "The right of citizens ... to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of sex." Id. amend. XIX.
171. "The right of citizens ... to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice
President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative of Con-
gress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay
any poll tax or other tax." Id. amend. XXIV, § I.
172. "The right of citizens ...eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any State on account of age." Id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
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Supreme Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment to place fur-
ther restrictions on the state's ability to place qualifications on the
right to vote and also to develop a fundamental right to vote appli-
cable to the states. 7 3 Therefore, any alleged impairment of this
right should be subject to strict scrutiny. 74
States have attempted to place restrictions on the right to vote in
"qualification"' 75 cases by requiring as a precondition to voting, the
payment of a poll tax, 176 that the person be a civilian,1 7 or have
property or children. 178 In each of these types of cases, the Court
applied strict scrutiny and found the precondition invalid as a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause. For example, in Kramer v. Union
Free School District No. 15,179 the Court invalidated a statute
which allowed only owners or lessees of taxable realty and parents
or guardians of children in public schools a right to vote. The Court
held that "statutes granting the [right to vote] to residents on a se-
lective basis always pose the danger of denying some citizens any
effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect
their lives."' 8
Similarly, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,'8' the Court
struck down the state's imposition of a poll tax as a voting require-
ment. The Court concluded that a "[s]tate violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the
affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral stan-
dard."' 82 Likewise, in Dunn v. Blumstein,8 3 the Court struck down
173. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (finding that the right to vote without
any restrictions is a valued political right, and any infringement on that right is subject to strict
judicial scrutiny).
174. Id.; see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 155, § 14.31 at 816-31 (analyzing the right to
vote as a fundamental right). For a discussion of "strict scrutiny," analysis, see supra note 161. In
more recent cases, the Supreme Court applied a balancing approach for voting instead of using
strict scrutiny. 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 161, § 18.3, at I (Supp. 1993). For an exam-
ple of the Court's use of a balancing test in a voting rights case, see Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S.
Ct. 2059 (1992) (holding that the interests asserted by the state of Hawaii in justifying its prohi-
bition of write-in voters were greater than the slight burdens the policy imposed on voters).
175. Term borrowed from Brief Amicus Curiae of the Colorado Bar Association at 10, Evans v.
Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.) (No. 93SA17), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993). The term
"qualification" refers to the states placing a qualification or precondition on an individual's right
to vote. Id.
176. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
177. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
178. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 626-27.
181. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
182. Id. at 666.
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durational residency requirements imposed by the states as a pre-
condition to voting.' 84 In this type of case, the Court recognized that
when states deny some citizens the right to vote, those citizens are
essentially deprived of a fundamental political right safeguarding all
rights. 8 '
The legislation under review in these cases violated the equal pro-
tection clause because the restriction directly "fence[d] out''86 cer-
tain classes of voters. The Court recognized that the right to vote is
the root of our constitutional system and is a fundamental right of
every citizen.18 7 The Court acknowledged that exercising the right
to vote is necessary to preserve our democratic system of govern-
ment and cannot be constitutionally annihilated because of fear of
differing political views.' 88 The right to vote is necessary to maintain
a citizen's full and effective participation in the political process. 189
2. Candidate Eligibility Cases
Similar to the restriction on voting cases, candidate eligibility
cases involve legislation preventing individuals from possessing a full
and effective voice in the political process. Candidate eligibility con-
cerns legislation which restricts or limits the number or type of par-
ties to be placed on the voting ballot. The practical barrier to ballot
access for independent candidates or non-established parties varies
greatly from state to state. In ballot access cases, the Court focuses
its inquiry on whether the challenged restriction unfairly or unnec-
essarily burdens the availability of political opportunity. 9
The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of ballot
access restrictions in 1968 in Williams v. Rhodes. 9' In that case,
183. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
184. The Colorado Supreme Court also invalidated such durational residency requirements. See
Jarmel v. Putnam, 499 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1972) (holding that a three month durational residency
requirement for voting in non-presidential elections was unconstitutional).
185. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336.
186. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
187. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (stating that "even the most basic
[rights], are illusory if the right to vote is undermined"); Jarmel, 499 P.2d at 603 (referring to
past cases that have shown that "the right to vote is at the core of our constitutional system and is
a fundamental right of every citizen").
188. Carrington, 380 U.S. at 94.
189. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (finding that full and effective participa-
tion by all citizens in the state government required that each citizen have an equally effective
voice in the election).
190. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983).
191. 393 U.S. 23 (1968), noted in The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 60, 86-
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Ohio law required new parties to file within ninety days before the
Ohio primary and that nominating petitions signed by a number of
registered voters equal at least fifteen percent of the total state vote
in the last gubernatorial election.192 The Court found that the elec-
tion laws made it virtually impossible for a new political party to be
placed on state ballots and effectively limited the ballot to the two
major parties. 193 The Court invoked strict scrutiny and held that
there was a denial of equal protection because a burden was placed
on the right of individuals to associate to further their political
ideas. 94 The Supreme Court has followed the same rationale in sim-
ilar cases.' 95
Equal access to the ballot for political parties as demonstrated in
Williams is important to safeguard the democratic institution and
further political participation. However, the states may enact differ-
ing legislation based on their own ideas of what constitutes fair and
effective participation in the context of candidate eligibility.'96 Nev-
ertheless, ballot access appears to be a vital part of preserving equal
access to political participation. Another aspect of the right to politi-
cal participation is reapportionment, discussed in the next section.
97 (1969).
192. Id. at 24-25.
193. Id. at 30. Only the Republican and Democratic candidates qualified for the ballot. Id. at
25. The Democratic and Republican parties only needed to obtain 10% of the votes cast in the
last gubernatorial election in order to retain their positions on the ballot. Id. at 25-26
194. Id. at 30; see Note, Developments in the Law: Elections, 88 HARV. L. RE v. 1111, 1135-36
(1975) (discussing possible infringement of associational freedoms as a better justification for ap-
plying strict scrutiny).
195. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (inquiring whether ballot access restric-
tion unnecessarily burdened availability of political opportunity); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979) (holding that regulation of a political party's funda-
mental rights of freedom of association and right to cast votes required a compelling justification).
However, the Colorado Supreme Court applied its own rationale with regard to "candidate
eligibility" in Colorado Libertarian Party v. Secretary of Colo., 817 P.2d 998 (Colo. 1991). In
that case, the Colorado court held that a one-year unaffiliation requirement on candidates of a
"qualified political organization" that was not imposed on candidates of the two major political
parties did not violate the equal protection clause. Id. at 1004. The Colorado Supreme Court
relied on Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), which upheld a California election statute that
denied ballot access to an independent candidate seeking elective public office if the candidate had
a registered affiliation with a qualified political party within one year prior to the immediately
preceding primary election. Id. at 1003. The requirement in Colorado Libertarian Party involved
no discrimination among independents and therefore, was valid. Id. at 1003-04.




Reapportionment is a "realignment or change in legislative dis-
tricts brought about by changes in population.' 97 It is constitution-
ally mandated by the requirement of equal representation, i.e., one
person, one vote.' The United States Constitution requires a new
apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives among
states "according to their respective numbers."' 99 A state statute
which violates a person's right to vote on a one man-one vote appor-
tionment is contrary to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 00
In reapportionment cases, such as Reynolds v. Sims, 20' the Su-
preme Court established the historic "one man one vote" test which
altered the analysis of political participation under the equal protec-
tion clause.2 °2 These cases reiterate the Court's realization of partic-
ipation as an important independent value demanding strict judicial
scrutiny. For example, in Reynolds, the Court noted that "since the
right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is
preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged in-
fringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized. 20 3
In Reynolds, the Court was confronted with a challenge to the
malapportionment of the Alabama state legislature. The Court re-
lied on the equal protection clause to formulate the one person one
vote rule20 4 and held that the two legislatively proposed plans for
197. Reapportionment is defined as a "realignment or change in legislative districts brought
about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 164, at 1264. Apportionment involves the
right to have one's vote be as meaningful as the vote of others. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
568 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963)). It is referred to as the "one
person, one vote" rule. Id. at 558.
198. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 164, at 1264 (stating under "reapportionment,"
that a statute "which violates the rights of persons to vote on a one man-one vote apportionment is
contrary to the equal protection clause") (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
199. "Representatives ... shall be apportioned among the several States ...according to
their respective Numbers ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
200. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
201. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
202. Id. at 562.
203. Id.; see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (finding that before the right to
vote can be restricted, "the purpose of the restriction and the assertedly overriding interests served
by it must meet close constitutional scrutiny"); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (stat-
ing that "even the most basic [rights] are illusory if the right to vote is undermined").
204. Chief Justice Warren formulated the one person, one vote rule:
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. . . . And, if a State should provide
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apportionment of seats in the Alabama legislature were invalid
under the equal protection clause because the apportionment was
not based on population and lacked rationality.2 05 The Court recog-
nized that citizens have an "inalienable right to full and effective-
participation in the political processes" of the state legislature.2 °6
In a companion case, Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of
Colorado,201 decided on the same day as Reynolds, the Court found
that a constitutional right exists for citizens to have their vote given
equal weight. The Court held that this right could not be rejected,
even by a majority vote of the state's electorate, if the plan for ap-
portionment did not satisfy the requirements of the equal protection
clause. 08 The fact that an apportionment scheme was adopted by a
majority was insufficient to uphold it or to restrict a court from tak-
ing action.20 9 The Court rationalized this holding by stating that
"'[o]ne's right to life, liberty, and property . . .and other funda-
mental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the out-
come of no elections.' A citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be
infringed simply because a majority of the people choose that it
be." 210
These cases stand for the proposition that dilution of the right to
vote violates the Equal Protection Clause. Reapportionment affects
an individual's right to have an equal say in our political society and
thus affects their political participation.211 The last category of
cases, those concerning voter initiated amendments, is discussed
that the votes of citizens in one part of the State should be given two times, or five
times, or 10 times the weight of votes of citizens in another part of the State, it could
hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing in the disfavored areas
had not been effectively diluted.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562. "IThe Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses
of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis." Id. at 568.
205. Id. at 585. The voting regulation discriminated against residents living in populous areas
in favor of those residents in rural sections. Id. at 562-63.
206. Id. at 565. The Court went on to say that a citizen's full and effective participation in
state government depended on each citizen having an "equally effective voice" in the election of
its members for the state legislature. Id.
207. 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
211. The equal protection guarantee of one person, one vote extends not only to congressional
districting plans and to state legislative districting, but also to local government apportionment.
See Board of Estimate of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 692 (1989) (holding that the equal
protection guarantee of one person, one vote extended to local government apportionment); accord
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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next.
4. Voter Amendments that Prevent Enactment of Particular
. Legislation
Cases concerning voter initiated amendments preventing a politi-
cal institution from enacting a certain type of legislation, most
closely resemble the development of a fundamental right to political
participation and the application of that right to homosexuals in the
Evans case. Such voter initiated amendments or measures are most
often held to violate the equal protection clause because they place
special burdens on a class of persons212 and interfere with the politi-
cal process.213
In Hunter v. Erickson214 and Washington v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1,215 the Court was confronted with racial classifications in
voter initiatives. In both cases, the Court held that the initiative vio-
lated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In
Hunter, the voters passed an amendment to the city charter which
required voter approval for any housing ordinance based on race,
religion, or ancestry, whereas other ordinances could be enacted by
the city council. 216 The Court applied strict scrutiny review and in-
validated the law due to the presence of a suspect class - race.217
The Court stated that the law placed "special burdens on racial mi-
norities within the governmental process. '218 The Court found that
this was just as unlawful as denying them the right to vote on equal
footing with others. 219 Although the amendment was adopted
through popular referendum, that did not immunize it from the
equal protection clause. 220 The Court reasoned that "the State may
no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more diffi-
cult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person's
212. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969) (holding that a city charter amendment
violated equal protection because it "place[d] special burdens on racial minorities within the gov-
ernmental process").
213. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (holding that voter
initiative interfered with the political process because it restricted minority group's ability to se-
cure public benefits).
214. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
215. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
216. 393 U.S. at 386.
217. Id. at 392-93.
218. Id. at 391.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 392.
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vote or give any group a smaller representation than another of
comparable size." '2 21
In Washington, the voters adopted an initiative which prohibited
school boards from requiring any student to attend a school other
than the one geographically nearest or next nearest to his home. 22
However, exceptions were permitted for almost all purposes except
racial integration. The Court relied on Hunter in holding that the
initiative violated the equal protection clause. The Court found that
the initiative reallocated power similar to what occurred and was
condemned in Hunter.223 The initiative removed the authority to ad-
dress a racial problem from the existing decisionmaking body in a
way that burdened minority interests.224 The Court held that the
equal protection clause "guarantee[d] racial minorities the right to
full participation in the political life of the community. 225
In a similar case, Reitman v. Mulkey,22 the Court held that an
article in the California Constitution violated the equal protection
clause because it involved the state in private racial discriminations.
The article was an initiative measure submitted to the people in a
state-wide ballot. It prohibited the state from denying any person
the right to decline to sell, lease, or rent his real property to any
person he chose.2 The Court approved the California court's exam-
ining the article in terms of its "immediate objective," its "ultimate
effect," and its "historical context and conditions existing prior to its
221. Id. at 393. The Hunter Court held that the Akron amendment discriminated against mi-
norities in that it "disadvantage[d] those who would benefit from laws barring racial, religious, or
ancestral discriminations as against those who would bar other discriminations or who would oth-
erwise regulate the real estate market in their favor." Id. at 391. The Court concluded that al-
though the amendment was facially neutral, that Negroes, Whites, Jews, and Catholics were all
subject to the same requirements if there was housing discrimination against them, "the reality
[was] that the law's impact [fell] on the minority." Id.
222. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1982). Prior to the passage
of this initiative, the local school board had the power to determine what programs would most
appropriately fill a school district's educational needs, including desegregation and student assign-
ments. Id. at 479-80.
223. Id. at 474.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 467.
226. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
227. Id. at 371. The measure was termed Proposition 14 and provided:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge,
directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or
rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property
to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
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enactment. '"228 The article did not just repeal existing law forbid-
ding private racial discriminations, "it was intended to authorize,
and [did] authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market." 2 9
In this situation, the Court held it was necessary to assess the poten-
tial impact of the action to determine whether the state was signifi-
cantly involved in discrimination.2 30  The Supreme Court agreed
with the California court that the article would "significantly en-
courage and involve the State in private discriminations."' 23' There-
fore, the initiative violated the equal protection clause.
In each of these three cases, Hunter, Washington, and Reitman,
the Court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate the initiative. Such a
standard was necessary due to the substantial burden the legislation
placed on the group's ability to participate in the governmental pro-
cess.2 32 For example, in Washington, the Court found that the law
removed the authority of the decisionmaking body to address a ra-
cial problem in such a way as to burden minority interests.233 The
legislation required a compelling justification because it restructured
the political process in a way that burdened certain groups.234
Overall, the aforementioned categories of cases - precondition
on voting, candidate eligibility, reapportionment, and voter initia-
tives preventing enactment of desired legislation - reflect the pro-
position that effective political participation is necessary to maintain
a just democratic society. All the cases dealt with participation in
228. Id. at 373. The immediate effect of the amendment was to repeal existing anti-racial dis-
crimination housing legislation and to prohibit similar measures from passing in the future. Id. at
374. The Supreme Court held that the initiative violated the equal protection clause because it
immunized "[tihe right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on racial grounds...
from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level of the state government." Id. at 377.
229. Id. at 381.
230. Id. at 380.
231. Id. at 381.
232. See TRIBE, supra note 161, § 16.6, at 1451-54 (discussing the application of strict scru-
tiny and the equal protection clause).
233. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 458 U.S. 457, 474 (1982).
234. Although each of these cases involved a suspect classification - race - the Evans court
argued that these cases cannot be limited to evaluation based on only a suspect classification. See
infra notes 278-357 and accompanying text (discussing the Evans court proposition that these
cases are analogous to their own situation and can be used to develop a fundamental right to equal
political participation).
The Court upheld a statute involving political participation, but where no suspect class was
discriminated against, in Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971). In Gordon, a West Virginia statute
required that political subdivisions receive approval of 60% of the voters in a referendum election
before they could incur bonded indebtedness. Id. at 2. The Court found that the requirement did
not discriminate or permit discrimination against any particular class and therefore, did not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 7.
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the political process, whether it was the right to vote, or the right to
be placed on a ballot. The Colorado court, in Evans v. Romer,
2 35
explored these cases in developing its fundamental right to partici-
pate equally in the political process. A detailed analysis of the
court's opinion follows in the next section.
II. SUBJECT OPINION: EVANS V. ROMER AND THE EMERGENCE
OF A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
A. Facts and Procedure
On November 3, 1992, the Colorado voters passed a state consti-
tutional amendment ("Amendment 2") by a margin of 53.4% to
46.6% .236 The amendment prohibited the state, its branches or de-
partments, or any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipali-
ties, and school districts from adopting or enforcing any law or pol-
icy that entitled any person to claim discrimination, protected
status, minority status, or quota preferences based on homosexual,
lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices, or relation-
ships.23 1 The amendment further made all existing anti-discrimina-
tion ordinances, laws, regulations, and policies prohibiting discrimi-
nation based on an individual's homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual
orientation unenforceable and unconstitutional. z28
On November 12, 1992, eight homosexuals, one heterosexual,
("individual plaintiffs") the Boulder Valley School District RE-2,
the City and County of Denver, the City Council of Aspen, and the
City of Boulder and City of Aspen ("governmental plaintiffs") (re-
ferred to collectively as "plaintiffs") 23 9 filed suit in Denver District
Court to enjoin the enforcement of Amendment 2 claiming that the
amendment was unconstitutional.2 40 The individual plaintiffs chal-
lenged Amendment 2 as violating their right to equal protection of
the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution on two grounds: (1) Amendment 2 did not rationally
advance any legitimate purpose, and (2) the amendment placed
unique burdens on the plaintiffs' ability to participate in the political
235. 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
236. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1272. For the full text of Amendment 2, see supra text accompanying
note 29.
237. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL. supra note 29, at 9.
238. Id.
239. See supra note 31 (detailing the list of plaintiffs).
240. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1272.
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process."4 The plaintiffs also raised First Amendment violations,2"2
as well as violations of the Supremacy24 and Due Process Clause "
of the United States Constitution, arguing that the amendment pro-
hibited state courts from enforcing statutes, regulations, ordinances,
and policies concerning discrimination based on sexual
orientation. 2 "5
Two of the governmental plaintiffs - the cities of Denver and
Boulder that have ordinances prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment, housing, and public accommodations on the basis of sexual
orientation2"' - asserted that Amendment 2 affected their home
rule powers because it limited their authority to adopt and enforce
legislation or regulations protecting rights granted under the United
States Constitution, particularly legislation and regulations prohibit-
ing discrimination within their municipal boundaries on the basis of
sexual orientation.247 The Boulder Valley School District RE-2,
which has a policy permitting students to seek redress for discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation,24 8 claimed that Amendment 2
would violate local control over educational policies protected by
241. Id. at 1272-73 n.2.
242. Id. They alleged that Amendment 2 violated their right to petition their government for a
redress of grievances; violated their rights to free expression and association, including the chilling
effect of Amendment 2 on those who would normally speak freely on matters related to gay,
lesbian, or bisexual orientation; violated the constitutional prohibition against the establishment of
religion; and was unconstitutionally vague. Id.; Amended Complaint at 7-9, Evans v. Romer, No.
92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 19678 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 1993), affid on other grounds, 854 P.2d
1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993). The federal constitutional claims were brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Amended Complaint at 7, Evans (No. 92 CV 7223). In addition,
the individual plaintiffs claimed that the use of the initiative to adopt Amendment 2 violated the
republican form of government guaranteed to each citizen by article IV, section 4 of the United
States Constitution and the Enabling Act to the Colorado Constitution. Id. at 9. They also
claimed that Amendment 2 constituted a revision of the state constitution that can only be done
through the constitutional convention process provided in article XIX, section 1 of the Colorado
Constitution. Id. at 9-10.
243. US. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
244. Id. amend. XIV, § I.
245. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1272 n.2. They also maintained that Amendment 2 violated the access
to the courts provision of the Colorado Constitution. Amended Complaint at 1I, Evans (No. 92
CV 7223) (referring to the COLO. CONST. art. I1, § 6).
246. DENVER. COLO., REV. MUN. CODE art. IV, § 28-91 to -116 (1991); BOULDER, COLO., REV.
CODE § 12-1-2 to -4 (1987).
247. Amended Complaint at 12, Evans (No. 92 CV 7223).
248. In June of 1992, the school district's board of education adopted Policy JFH, Student
Complaints and Grievances. Id. at 6. It was issued simultaneously with implementing regulation.
Id. Both the policy and its regulation prohibited discrimination against any student. Id. A proce-
dure was established to provide the right for aggrieved students to seek redress for discrimination,
including discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id.
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Article IX, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution.4 9 All of the
governmental plaintiffs claimed that Amendment 2 placed them in
the position of incurring legal liability for violation of the federal
constitution under the Supremacy Clause. 50
After the district court denied the plaintiffs' request for an expe-
dited hearing on the merits,2 51 the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of the amend-
ment. 52 In support of this motion, plaintiffs argued that Amend-
ment 2 denied gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals equal protection of
the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment and that it violated the
First Amendment's protection for expressive conduct.253 Under the
Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiffs argued first that Amendment
2 burdened their right to participate equally in the political pro-
cess.2 54 Second, plaintiffs argued that Amendment 2 did not ration-
ally advance any legitimate governmental purpose.2 55 Following an
evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion
barring the enforcement of Amendment 2 pending the outcome of a
trial on the merits. 256 The district court did not address the First
249. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1272 n.2.
250. Amended Complaint at 11, Evans (No. 92 CV 7223) (citing to a violation of the U.S.
CONST. art. VI, para. 2).
251. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1273.
252. Id. A plaintiff may move for a preliminary injunction in order to prevent the defendant
from doing something, or, in this case, to prevent enactment of the amendment. BLACK'S LAW
DiCTIONARY, supra note 164, at 784-85. The injunction is granted when the suit is commenced,
and it may either be "discharged or made perpetual, according to the result of the controversy, as
soon as the rights of the parties are determined." Id. at 785. A preliminary injunction is granted
when the party clearly shows "(I) probable success upon a trial on the merits, and (2) likely
irreparable injury [] unless the injunction is granted, or (3) [although there is difficulty showing
probable success, the party] raised substantial and difficult issues meriting further inquiry, that
the harm to [that party] outweighs the injury to others if it is denied." Id. at 1180.
253. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1273.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Evans v. Romer, No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 19678, at *12 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15,
1993). The trial court evaluated plaintiffs' claims under Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648,
653-54 (Colo. 1982), which enunciated a six part test - the applicable standard for the issuance
of a preliminary injunction. The trial court held that plaintiffs satisfied this test. Evans, No. 92
CV 7223, 1993 WL 19678, at *12. Under Rathke, a moving party must establish "a clear show-
ing that injunctive relief [was] necessary to protect existing ... fundamental constitutional
rights." Rathke, 648 P.2d at 653. If this threshold requirement was met, the trial court was to
determine whether the moving party demonstrated: a likelihood that they would succeed on the
merits; a risk immediate and irreparable injury which could be prevented by injunctive relief; that
there was no other timely adequate remedy at law; that granting a preliminary injunction would
not harm the public interest; that balancing equities favored the injunction; and that the status
quo would be preserved while awaiting a trial on the merits. Id. at 653-54.
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
Amendment claim.
The trial court concluded that plaintiffs met their burden of proof
under Rathke v. MacFarlane25 by demonstrating that it was neces-
sary to enjoin the enforcement of Amendment 2 in order to protect
their right to equal protection of the laws under the United States
Constitution.2 58 The trial court reasoned that homosexuals, lesbians,
and bisexuals were an "identifiable class" '259 that had a fundamental
right "not to have the State endorse and give effect to private
biases."260
The trial court held that because there was a fundamental right
involved with Amendment 2, its constitutionality would have to be
assessed under the strict scrutiny standard of review.26' Under this
standard, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had a reasona-
ble probability of proving that Amendment 2 was
unconstitutional 262
Defendants appealed 263 and the Colorado Supreme Court granted
review. The basis of defendants' challenge to the preliminary injunc-
tion pertained only to the trial court's determination that the plain-
tiffs had met their burden of proof under Rathke2614 "that injunctive
relief [was] necessary to protect existing fundamental constitutional
rights. '265 The defendants argued that Amendment 2 did not in-
fringe on any legal precedent or right established under the Four-
teenth Amendment's equal protection clause.266 Plaintiffs presented
the same equal protection arguments to the Colorado Supreme
Court that it did to the trial court; however, plaintiffs did not urge
the Court to rely on the right identified by the trial court.267 In-
257. 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982); see supra note 256 (discussing the Rathke standard).
258. Evans, No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 19678, at *12.
259. Id.
260. Id. at *11. The trial court cited Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) and Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) as support for this position. Evans, No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL
19678, at *10-11 (analyzing these as cases submitted by plaintiffs). The court quoted the Supreme
Court's statement in Palmore, that "[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the
law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." Id. at *I I (quoting Palmore, 466 U.S. at
433). The court also stated that Reitman involved a fundamental right because it took "private
discrimination [in housing] and ...gave state support to it." Id. at *10.
261. Id. at *12. For an analysis of the strict scrutiny standard, see supra note 161.
262. Evans, No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 19678, at *12.
263. 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct, 419 (1993).
264. 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982); see supra note 256 (discussing the Rathke standard).
265. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1274.
266. Id..
267. Id.; see supra notes 257-62 and accompanying text (discussing the right identified by the
trial court).
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stead, the plaintiffs argued that the right identified by the trial court
was a fundamental right to political participation, a right violated
by Amendment 2.268 The Colorado Supreme Court considered this
argument on appeal.2"9
B. The Majority Opinion
Although the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
issuance of a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the
amendment, 70 it did so for different reasons. Instead of relying on
the trial court's "private biases" argument,"' the Colorado Su-
preme Court held that homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals have a
fundamental right to participate on an equal basis in the political
process.27 2 The Evans court developed the fundamental right
through case law concerning preconditions on the right to vote,73
reapportionment,2 74 "candidate eligibility," 275 and legislation which
prevented political processes from enacting particular legislation de-
sired by a certain class of voters.2 76 After establishing that a funda-
mental right existed, the court discussed the objective and effects of
Amendment 2 in relation to the right to participate equally in the
268. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1273.
269. The Colorado Supreme Court recognized "[tlhat gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals have
not been found to constitute a suspect class ...and that plaintiffs [did] not claim that they
constitute[d] such a class." Id. at 1275. However, the court found that the equal protection clause
still applied through the existence of a fundamental right. Id. at 1276.
270. In affirming the trial court's issuance of a preliminary injunction, the Colorado Supreme
Court independently reviewed the question of whether Amendment 2 violated an existing constitu-
tional right. Id. at 1275. The court stated that the requirement the plaintiffs must meet under
Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982), pertained only to whether an existing constitu-
tional right was infringed by Amendment 2. Id.; see supra note 256 (discussing the Rathke stan-
dard). The issue under review was strictly a question of law and was subject to de novo review on
appeal. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1275.
271. See supra note 260 and accompanying text (discussing the trial court's "private biases"
argument).
272. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1286.
273. Id. at 1277. The "precondition to voting" cases were: Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating the requirement that voters have property or children);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating the requirement that voters
pay a poll tax); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (invalidating the requirement that voters
be civilians).
274. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1277-78 (focusing on Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
275. Id. at 1278 (discussing Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S.
173 (1979) and Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)).
276. Id. at 1279-84 (focusing on Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 458 U.S. 457 (1982),
Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. I (1971), and Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969)).
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political process177 and found that this right was "clearly affected by
Amendment 2, because it bar[red] gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals
from having an effective voice in governmental affairs" and "al-
ter[ed] the political process so that a targeted class [was] prohibited
from obtaining legislative, executive, and judicial protection or re-
dress from discrimination. '2 78 Thus, Amendment 2 infringed on the
homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals fundamental right to equal
participation in the political process and the court enjoined its
enforcement.279
The Evans court developed this fundamental right through the
fundamental right strand of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Pro-
tection Clause.2 80 The court determined that a fundamental right
existed and thus strict scrutiny applied by relying on numerous
equal protection cases decided by the United States Supreme Court
over the last thirty years.2 81 The Evans court found that these cases
manifested a democratic value on the individual's ability to partici-
pate in the political process.282 The court separated the equal pro-
tection cases into four categories: (1) cases involving direct restric-
tions or "preconditions" on the exercise of the political participation
franchise, i.e., the right to vote; (2) reapportionment cases; (3) mi-
nority party rights or "candidate eligibility" cases; and (4) cases in-
volving attempts to limit a certain groups' ability to have desired
legislation implemented through the normal political processes.2 81
The Evans court held that these cases combined demonstrated that
the equal protection clause guaranteed the fundamental right to
equal participation in the political process.284 The court further held
that any attempt to infringe on a group's exercise of this right was
subject to strict scrutiny.285 These four categories of cases are dis-
cussed in the following text.
277. Id. at 1284-86.
278. Id. at 1285.
279. Id. at 1286.
280. See supra notes 272-79 and accompanying text (discussing the fundamental right
analysis).
281. See supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text (citing and discussing these cases).
282. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1276.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. To support this conclusion, the court cited Dunn v. Blumstein, finding that "[i]n deci-
sion after decision, this Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right
to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction." Id. at 1276-77
(citing Dunn, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)).
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1. Legislation Restricting the Exercise of the Right to Vote
The Evans court noted that its first category of cases, those in-
volving legislation placing preconditions on the exercise of the right
to vote, were consistently struck down by the United States Su-
preme Court as violating equal protection because the legislation
under review directly "fenced out" 28 6 certain classes of voters.
217
The Court pointed out that restrictions on the right to vote based on
a requirement that voters pay a poll tax,28 8 be civilians, 28 9 or have
property or children 290 violated the equal protection clause. 291 The
Evans court adopted the rationale in Kramer v. Union Free School
District No. 1291 to support applying strict scrutiny in these cases.
293
The Kramer Court expressed that legislation which selectively
granted the franchise "always pose[d] the danger of denying some
citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which sub-
stantially affect[ed] their lives. '"294 Thus, the Evans court indicated
that close judicial scrutiny was required when "legislation im-
pair[ed] a group's ability to effectively participate [] in the [govern-
mental] process." 29 The Evans court analogized this emphasis on
the value of equal participation discussed in the precondition to vot-
ing cases, to the second category of cases, those concerning
reapportionment.296
2. Reapportionment 297
The Evans court cited Reynolds v. Sims 298 to both analogize and
286. The court was referring to Carrington v. Rash, where the Court held that " '[fencing out'
from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally
impermissible." Carrington, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965). In Carrington, the Court held unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the equal protection clause, a Texas provision that prohibited any member
of the United States armed forces who moved to Texas during the course of his military duty from
ever voting in any election in that state so long as he or she was in the armed forces. Id. at 97.
287. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1277.
288. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
289. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
290. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
291. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1277.
292. 395 U.S. 621 (1969); see supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (discussing Kramer).
293. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1277.
294. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627.
295. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1277 (noting that "effective" participation was not to be confused with
"successful" participation).
296. Id. at 1277-78
297. See supra note 197 (defining reapportionment).
298. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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distinguish reapportionment with the precondition on voting cases
discussed in the previous section.2 99 The court cited Reynolds as rec-
ognizing the significance of political participation and the necessity
for applying a standard of strict scrutiny when that participation
may be limited or hindered. 00 The Evans court quoted Reynolds as
acknowledging the proposition that "'since the right to exercise the
[right to vote] in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of
other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously
scrutinized.' "301
The legislation involved in the reapportionment cases differs from
legislation imposing a precondition on the right to vote in that dilu-
tion of the vote, not denial of the vote, is at issue. 0 2 The Evans
court discussed this distinction in reference to Reynolds, stating that
the legislation involved in that case did not require fulfillment of a
contingency before one could vote because no one was prevented or
deterred from voting. 0 3 Rather, the Evans court indicated, Reyn-
olds involved the equal protection clause and its "participatory ef-
fectiveness, i.e., the right to have one's vote be as meaningful as the
votes of others." 30' Thus, the Evans court concluded that Reynolds
reflected the proposition set forth in reapportionment cases that the
equal protection of the laws guarantee was violated when a group's
exercise of the right to vote was made less effective not only because
the right to vote is constitutionally mandated, but because that right
insures meaningful and effective participation in the political pro-
cess. 05 The Evans court analyzed this principle of "full and effec-
299. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1277-78.
300. Id. at 1277; see supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text (discussing the Reynolds case
as it applies to reapportionment).
301. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1277 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562). To further support this
proposition, the Evans court cited Wesberry v. Sanders, stating that "'even the most basic
[rights], are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.' " Id. (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1, 17 (1964)).
302. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565 (holding that an individual's right to vote for state legisla-
tors is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is substantially diluted compared with votes of
citizens living in other parts of the state); see also Board of Estimate of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S.
688, 701 (1989) (adopting the Reynolds Court analysis that in order to "calculat[e] the deviation
among [election] districts, the relevant inquiry is whether 'the vote of any citizen is approximately
equal in weight to that of any other citizen' ").
303. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1277-78. In Reynolds, the voting regulation discriminated against resi-
dents of the states' populous counties in favor of rural areas. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 563.
304. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1278; see supra notes 198-200 (discussing the one-man-one-vote rule).
305. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1278.
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tive political participation" developed in the reapportionment cases
in relation to the third category of cases, those concerning "candi-
date eligibility." 306
3. "Candidate Eligibility3 0 7
The Evans court expanded on the one-man-one-vote principle in
its review of ballot access or "candidate eligibility" cases. The Ev-
ans court first considered Williams v. Rhodes.308 The court recog-
nized Williams as illustrating that state statutes deny equal protec-
tion of the laws by placing a considerable burden on the voters'
right to effectively cast their votes, regardless of their political affili-
ation. 309 The Evans court pointed out that the Williams court ap-
plied the strict scrutiny standard of review to hold the Ohio election
laws invalid under the equal protection clause, concluding that "only
a compelling interest could justify 'imposing such heavy burdens on
the right to vote and to associate.' "310
The Evans court also briefly examined Illinois State Board of
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party3 1' where the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional an Illinois Election Code that required more
than 25,000 signatures to place independent candidates and new po-
litical parties on state ballots whereas only signatures of five percent
of eligible voters was required at the local level.312 The Evans court
noted that even though the Supreme Court recognized a valid state
interest in regulating the number of candidates appearing on a bal-
lot, the Court invalidated the Illinois laws, holding that they "un-
necessarily restricted a constitutionally protected liberty."313
The Evans court noted that the "precondition," reapportionment,
and "candidate eligibility" cases did not directly control the Amend-
306. Id.
307. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (defining candidate eligibility).
308. 393 U.S. 23 (1968); see supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text (discussing Williams).
309. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1278 (citing Williams, 393 U.S. at 31).
310. Id. (quoting Williams, 393 U.S. at 31).
311. 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
312. Id. at 187.
313. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1278. The Supreme Court held the Illinois laws unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment freedom of associ-
ation. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 184. The Supreme Court recognized that ballot access
restrictions burden two fundamental rights: "the right of individuals to associate for the advance-
ment of political beliefs" (First Amendment) and "the right of qualified voters, regardless of their
political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively" (Fourteenth Amendment). Id.
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
ment 2 issue. 14 The court admitted that those cases involved consti-
tutional problems distinct from those addressed in Evans v.
Romer.316 However, the Evans court explained that the relevance of
those cases to the Amendment 2 issue concerned the consistent rec-
ognition by the United States Supreme Court of the exceeding im-
portance of political participation in our governmental system.316
The Supreme Court articulated that importance through the princi-
ple that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the fundamental
right to participate equally in the political process and thus, any
attempt to infringe on that right must be subject to strict scrutiny
and can be held constitutionally valid only if supported by a compel-
ling state interest. '17 The Evans court recognized that this funda-
mental principle applied to the fourth category of cases, those in-
volving legislation which prevented the normal political institutions
and processes from enacting particular legislation desired by a cer-
tain group of voters.318
4. Legislation Which Prevents Certain Voters From Enacting De-
sired Legislation
The Evans court observed that legislation which prevents the nor-
mal political institutions and processes from enacting legislation de-
sired by a certain group of voters, more closely resembled the ques-
tion presented by Amendment 2.319 Yet, the Evans court indicated
that all four categories of cases it discussed 320 adopted the principle
that laws may not burden the right to equal political participation
for a certain group unless supported by a compelling state
interest.3 21
In each case falling within this fourth category, the legislation
was held to violate the Equal Protection Clause. 22 The Evans court
relied on three cases to further develop its finding that a fundamen-
314. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1278.
315. Id.




320. Namely, the precondition on voting cases, the reapportionment cases, the cases involving
candidate eligibility, and cases concerning voter initiatives preventing enactment of desired
legislation.
321. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1279.
322. For a discussion of the cases striking down such legislation as violating equal protection,
see supra notes 212-34 and accompanying text.
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tal right to equal participation in the political process exists not only
for everyone, but also in this particular circumstance, for homosexu-
als, lesbians, and bisexuals. The first case discussed was Hunter v.
Erickson.323
The Evans court recognized that a municipal charter amendment
in Hunter was aimed at minority racial groups, and noted that the
concerns addressed in Hunter were not limited to racial discrimina-
tion.324 To support this proposition, the court in Evans referred to
Justice White's32 5 conclusion in Hunter that although Akron could
have required a majority vote on all its municipal legislation, by do-
ing otherwise, "Akron could 'no more disadvantage any particular
group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf
than it may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller
representation than another of comparable size.'"31 The Evans
court pointed out that the Hunter court did not rely on precedent
concerning racial minorities in relation to voting in reaching this
conclusion.327 Instead, the Evans court noted, the Supreme Court
cited Reynolds v. Sims328 and Avery v. Midland County,32 neither
of which involved racial discrimination, or any other recognized sus-
pect class.330
The Evans court further justified its finding that Hunter was not
limited to racial discrimination by comparing Justice Harlan and
Justice Stewart's concurring opinions in Hunter with their dissents
in Reitman v. Mulkey.331 In Reitman, the dissenting Justices dis-
agreed that an article to the California constitution was unconstitu-
323. 393 U.S. 385 (1969); see supra notes 214-21 and accompanying text (discussing Hunter).
324. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1279-80.
325. Justice White wrote the majority opinion in Hunter.
326. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1279 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393).
327. Id.
328. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
329. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
330. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1280. The Supreme Court has held race, ethnicity, and national origin
to be traditionally suspect classes. Galloway, supra note 140, at 124; see supra text accompanying
notes 147-54 (discussing relevant characteristics of a suspect class). The voting regulation in
Reynolds discriminated against residents living in populous areas in favor of those residents in
rural sections. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 545-46; see supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text
(discussing the Reynolds case). In Avery, the discrimination was between taxpayers in different
districts. Avery, 390 U.S. at 474. The Court held in Avery that, when developing local government
arrangements, the Constitution required that units with "general governmental powers over an
entire geographical area not be apportioned among single-member districts of substantially une-
qual population." Id. at 485-86.
331. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1280; see supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text (discussing
Reitman).
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tional because the state action was neutral, meaning it did not ac-
tively and purposefully promote discrimination. 3"2 The Evans court
indicated that in their concurring opinions in Hunter, Justices
Harlan and Stewart observed that, "unlike the California initiative,
'the City of Akron [had] not attempted to allocate governmental
power on the basis of any general principle.' -333 Instead, the Evans
court continued, the concurring Justices found that the fair housing
ordinance in Hunter violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
was passed with the intent of ensuring that racial and religious mi-
norities had more difficulty enacting beneficial legislation. 3 4
The second case the Evans court relied on in discussing its fourth
category of cases was Washington v. Seattle School District No.
1.335 The Evans court analyzed this case as presenting another situ-
ation in which a minority group was denied consideration of an issue
through the political process.330 The Evans court noted that the Su-
preme Court in Washington relied on Hunter v. Erickson3 3 7 to hold
that by passing an initiative which prevented the use of busing to
achieve desegregation, the voters had "impermissibly interfered with
the political process and unlawfully burdened the efforts of minority
groups to secure public benefits." '38
The Evans court emphasized that the Court in Washington held
332. Justice Harlan believed that "the state action required to bring the Fourteenth Amend-
ment into operation must be affirmative and purposeful, actively fostering discrimination." Reit-
man, 387 U.S. at 395.
333. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1280 (citing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 395 (1969) (Harlan,
J., concurring)). In Hunter, Justices Harlan and Stewart described the "general principle" as
follows:
The existence of a bicameral legislature or an executive veto may on occasion make it
more difficult for minorities to achieve favorable legislation; nevertheless, they may
not be attacked on equal protection grounds since they are founded on neutral princi-
ples. Similarly, the rule which makes it relatively difficult to amend a state constitu-
tion is commonly justified on the theory that constitutional provisions should be more
thoroughly scrutinized and more soberly considered than are simple statutory enact-
ments. Here, too, Negroes may stand to gain by the rule if a fair housing law is made
part of the constitution, or they may lose if the constitution adopts a position of strict
neutrality on the question. But even if Negroes are obliged to undertake the arduous
task of amending the state constitution, they are not thereby denied equal protection.
For the rule making constitutional amendment difficult is grounded in neutral
principle.
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 394-95 (Harlan, J., concurring).
334. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1280 (citing Hunter, 393 U.S. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
335. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
336. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1280; see supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text (discussing
Washington).
337. 393 U.S. 385 (1969); see supra notes 214-21 and accompanying text (discussing Hunter).
338. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1280 (referring to Washington, 458 U.S. at 467-70).
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that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to "political structures"
that transform the governmental process in such a way that it places
special burdens on the minority group's ability to achieve legislation
in its interest."3 9 As the Court in Washington indicated and the Ev-
ans court agreed, substantial burdens were imposed on racial minor-
ities since the initiative used racc to define the governmental deci-
sionmaking structure instead of relying on neutral principles. 340
After discussing Hunter and Washington, the Evans court con-
cluded that the "neutrality" concept was applicable beyond the ra-
cial context.34' The Evans court argued that to hold otherwise would
make neutrality "a requirement of nondiscrimination with respect to
racial minorities - and not at all a requirement that legislation
must 'attemp[t] to allocate governmental power on the basis of any
general principle.' "342
The Evans court supported this conclusion by discussing Gordon
v. Lance,34 3 the third case it relied on to analogize the fourth cate-
gory of cases to the Amendment 2 issue. In Gordon, the Supreme
Court upheld a West Virginia constitutional requirement that politi-
cal subdivisions may not incur bonded indebtedness or increase
taxes without a 60% majority. " The Court found that the require-
ment did not discriminate against or authorize discrimination
against any identifiable class and therefore, did not violate the equal
protection clause. 43
The Evans court noted that the Court in Gordon distinguished
Hunter on two grounds. First, the West Virginia statute applied
''equally to all bond issues for any purpose" while the ordinance in
Hunter required a referendum only for fair housing legislation.3,4
Second, the legislation in Hunter singled out the group benefiting
from anti-discrimination laws based on race, religion, or ancestry,
339. Id. (citing Washington, 458 U.S. at 467).
340. Id. at 1281 (referring to Washington, 458 U.S. at 470).
341. Id.
342. Id. (referring to Washington, 458 U.S. at 470).
343. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
344. Id. at 8.
345. Id. at 5. Plaintiffs were a group of individuals who voted in favor of two proposals which
required 60% voter approval. One proposal required general obligation bonds to be issued in order
to build new schools and improve existing educational facilities. Id. at 3. The second proposal
authorized the Board of Education to levy additional taxes to support the current expenditures
and capital improvements. Id. Of the votes cast, 51.55% favored the bond issue and 51.51%
favored the tax levy. Id.
346. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1281 (Colo.) (citing Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
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while the West Virginia statute singled out no such identifiable
class. a47
The Evans court considered the Gordon Court's discussion of
Hunter significant in two respects. First, the Evans court noted that
Gordon did not involve race or any other recognized suspect class,
yet it discussed Hunter.3"8 Furthermore, the Gordon Court did not
discuss the fact that the West Virginia law was racially neutral,
whereas the ordinance in Hunter was based on race.349 The Evans
court found that if, as the defendants suggested in the case at issue,
Hunter was purely a "race" case, the Supreme Court in Gordon
could have dismissed Hunter as inapplicable.3 5 0 By not doing so, the
Evans court suggested that the holding in Hunter was not limited in
application to legislation based on racial discrimination. 51
The second reason the Evans court believed the reference to
Hunter in Gordon was important related to the concept of legisla-
tion singling out an identifiable class of persons. The Evans court
pointed out that although in Gordon the Court recognized that the
Hunter ordinance singled out those who would benefit from anti-
discrimination legislation concerning race, religion, and ancestry, it
did not consider the type of class discriminated against in Hunter to
be important. 52 Rather, the Evans court explained, "the salient as-
pect of Hunter which distinguished it from the situation presented
in Gordon was the absence of a group of voters that was 'indepen-
dently identifiable' apart from the group created by the statute
itself. 353
The Evans court found that, together, these facts demonstrated
that Hunter applied beyond racial discrimination, "to a broad spec-
347. Id. at 1281-82 (citing Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5). The Gordon Court was unable to find any
"independently identifiable group or category that favor[ed] bonded indebtedness over other forms
of financing." Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5.





353. Id. To support this proposition, the Evans court referred to Town of Lockport, N.Y. v.
Citizens for Community Action, Inc., 430 U.S. 259 (1977). The Evans court stated that the Court
in Town of Lockport cited Gordon and Hunter as support for the proposition that "'a referendum
voting scheme that can be characterized in mathematical terms as giving disproportionate power
to a minority does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, there being no discrimination against
an identifiable class.' " Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282 n.20 (quoting Town of Lockport, 430 U.S. at 268
n.13).
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trum of discriminatory legislation." '54 The controlling constitutional
standard, the Evans court determined, was articulated in Gordon
that so long as the legislation did not "discriminate against or au-
thorize discrimination against any identifiable class," it did not vio-
late the equal protection clause.355
Based on its analysis of the equal protection cases in all four cate-
gories (preconditions on voting; reapportionment; "candidate eligi-
bility;" legislation which prevents the normal political institutions
and processes from enacting particular legislation desired by an
identifiable group of voters), the Evans court concluded that the
equal protection clause of the federal Constitution "protect[ed] the
fundamental right to participate equally in the political process, and
that any legislation or state constitutional amendment which in-
fringe[d] on this right by 'fencing out' an independently identifiable
class of persons must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny."356
Therefore, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected defendants' con-
tention that the amendment did not infringe on any recognized right
protected by the Equal Protection Clause. 57
354. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282. The Colorado Supreme court indicated that if Gordon and
Hunter were decided solely on the basis of "suspect classification," the Court would not have
"consistently" expressed the "paramount importance of political participation," nor would the
Court have applied strict scrutiny to legislation which infringed on the right to participate equally
in the political process. Id. at 1283. Instead, the Evans court explained, the Supreme Court need
only have recognized the suspect class at issue and applied strict scrutiny regardless of the right or
opportunity restricted. Id.
355. Id. at 1282 (referring to Gordon, 403 U.S. at 7). The Evans court recognized that in
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the Supreme Court upheld an amendment to the Cali-
fornia constitution that required approval by a majority of the voters in a local election for the
development of any low-rent housing project. Id. at 1282 n.21. The mandatory referendum proce-
dure was not limited to proposals for low-cost public housing. James, 402 U.S. at 142. In James,
the Court held that this procedure "ensured democratic decisionmaking" and did not violate the
equal protection clause. Id. at 143. The Court further declined to apply Hunter since the amend-
ment did not concern race. Id. at 141. The Evans court noted that three Justices dissented, not by
disagreeing with the majority's use of Hunter, but because the provision involved a suspect classi-
fication: poverty. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282 n.21. Thus, the Evans court concluded that-James was
"best understood as a case declining to apply suspect class status to the poor, and not as a limita-
tion on Hunter." Id.
356. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282.
357. Id. at 1283. The Evans court rejected defendants' proposition that Amendment 2 did not
violate any right protected under the equal protection clause for several reasons. First, the defend-
ants argued that the authority relied on by the Colorado Supreme Court was misplaced. Id. De-
fendants contended that, that authority recognized a cognizable equal protection claim " 'only
when the political process ha[d] been restructured to place unusual burdens upon racial groups, or
in the most expansive sense, [upon politically powerless groups].' " Id. The Evans court rejected
this proposition by stating that much of the authority cited did not involve racial groups. Id.; see,
e.g.. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979) (holding state
election statutes which discriminate against minority parties at local elections unconstitutional
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5. Amendment 2 Infringed on the Fundamental Right to Equal
Political Participation
Relying on cases such as Hunter v. Erickson58 and Gordon v.
Lance,3 5' the Colorado Supreme Court found that there was a fun-
damental right to participate equally in the political process.3 60 The
inquiry, therefore, was whether Amendment 2 infringed on the fun-
damental right to participate equally in the political process. 6' By
reviewing Amendment 2's immediate objective, ultimate effect, his-
torical context, and the conditions prior to its enactment, the Evans
court concluded that Amendment 2 did infringe on this fundamental
right. 62
under the equal protection clause); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (holding durational
one-year residence requirement prior to voting unconstitutional); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1
(1971) (holding municipal code which required three-fifth majority to incur debt constitutional);
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (holding that limiting a franchise
to those owning or leasing property or having children in school was unconstitutional); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (holding that the state election statutes which effectively eliminated
voters a choice of two political parties was unconstitutional); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) (holding that reapportionment diluting votes in one district violated the fundamental right
to have votes counted equally); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that the Georgia
statute on apportionment of district was unconstitutional). The Evans court reiterated its discus-
sion of Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) and Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), to
support this proposition. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1283.
358. 393 U.S. 385 (1969); see supra notes 323-34 and accompanying text (relating to the
court's analysis of Hunter).
359. 403 U.S. 1 (1971); see supra notes 343-53 (relating to the court's discussion of Gordon).
360. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1276-82.
361. Id. at 1284.
362. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court indicated the immediate objective of Amendment 2 was
"at a minimum, to repeal existing statutes, regulations, ordinances, and policies of state and local
entities that barred discrimination based on sexual orientation." Id. The Evans court pointed out
that Amendment 2 also repealed "various provisions prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation at state colleges." Id. at 1284-85.
The Evans court found that "[tihe 'ultimate effect' of Amendment 2 [was] to prohibit any
governmental entity from adopting similar, or more protective statutes, regulations, ordinances, or
policies in the future unless the state constitutional is first amended to permit such measures." Id.
at 1285. The court noted that if any governmental entity acted without such a constitutional
amendment, it "would be acting contrary to the state constitution by 'adopting, enacting, or en-
forcing' any such measure." Id.
The Evans court also examined the political conditions for homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals
prior to the passage of Amendment 2. Id. at 1286. The court noted that before Amendment 2 was
passed, "gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals were ... free to appeal to state and local government
for protection against sexual orientation discrimination." Id. "[T]he political process was open to
them to seek" beneficial legislation just as it was open for others. Id. However, the court illus-
trated, had Amendment 2 been in effect, the only political means available to this class of persons
to seek protection would have been through adoption of a constitutional amendment. Id. There-
fore, the court found that Amendment 2 infringed on a fundamental right protected by the equal
protection clause and thus must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Id. Applying this standard,
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The court found that Amendment 2 "clearly affected" the right
to participate equally in the political process because it barred
homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals from "having an effective voice
in governmental affairs insofar as those persons deem[ed] it benefi-
cial to seek legislation that would protect them from discrimination
based on their sexual orientation. 8 63  The court stated that
"Amendment 2 alters the political process" by prohibiting gays, les-
bians, and bisexuals "from obtaining legislative, executive, and judi-
cial protection or redress from discrimination absent the consent of
a majority of the electorate through the adoption of a constitutional
amendment. ' 8 4 The Evans court indicated that Amendment 2 did
not attempt to entirely withdraw antidiscrimination issues from
state and local control. 36 5 Instead, "it single[d] out one form of dis-
crimination and remove[d] its redress from consideration by the
normal political processes. 366
The Evans court held that "[i]n short, gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals are left out of the political process through denial of hav-
ing an 'effective voice in the governmental affairs which substan-
tially affected their lives.' ",367 Therefore, the court ruled strict scru-
tiny was necessary because the normal political processes no longer
protected these groups of individuals.3 68 Amendment 2 prohibited
this class of persons from seeking favorable governmental action and
thus, from participating equally in the political process. 369 The court
found no compelling interest that passed the strict scrutiny test.370
the Colorado Supreme Court held that the defendants had not established a compelling state
interest to justify enacting Amendment 2. Id.; see, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (stating that to meet strict scrutiny, a law must be "suitably
tailored to serve a compelling state interest"); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982) (ex-
plaining the necessity of strict scrutiny analysis when a fundamental right is challenged). There-
fore, the court "conclude[d] that plaintiffs have met their burden under Rathke v. MacFarlane,
648 P.2d 648, 653 (Colo. 1982)." Evans, 854 P.2d at 1286; see supra note 256 (discussing the
standard under Rathke).
363. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1285.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. The court compared Amendment 2 to the laws invalidated in Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 385 (1969). Id. Those laws singled out the class of persons "who would benefit from laws
barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations." Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391. Similarly, the
Evans court held, Amendment 2 singled out homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals from laws bar-
ring discrimination based on sexual orientation. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1285.




370. Id. at 1286; see supra note 161 (discussing the strict scrutiny standard of review).
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Adding this reasoning to its finding of a fundamental right to equal
political participation supported by U.S. Supreme Court precedent,
the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the granting of a preliminary
injunction enjoining defendants from enforcing Amendment 2 pend-
ing a trial on the merits of plaintiffs' constitutional challenge. 71
C. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent, written by Justice Erickson, re-stated the issue in Ev-
ans v. Romer: whether a preliminary injunction was properly issued
in accordance with Rathke v. MacFarlane72 and the requirements
articulated therein. 37 3 Since -the court was reviewing issues of law as
opposed to issues of fact, the dissent stated that a de novo standard
of review applied.174 Based on that standard, Justice Erickson would
reverse and discharge the preliminary injunction, remanding it for
trial on the permanent injunction.37 5
1. Rejection of the Majority's Fundamental Right Analysis
The dissent first addressed the trial court's fundamental right the-
ory. The trial court found that there was "a fundamental right 'not
to have the State endorse and give effect to private biases' with re-
spect to 'an identifiable class.' ,,"71 The dissent rejected the district
court's finding of such a fundamental right as it had never been
identified or recognized by the United States Supreme Court or any
other court.377 Although the majority did not rely on the district
371. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1286.
372. 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982); see supra note 256 (discussing the Rathke standard).
373. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1286 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 1287; see supra notes 257-62 and accompanying text (relating to the trial court's
fundamental right analysis).
377. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1287 (Erickson, J., dissenting). The dissent took issue with the cases
relied on by the district court and stated that those cases did not apply a fundamental right
analysis, but instead involved traditionally suspect classifications or the application of rational
basis review. Id. at 1293. The district court cited Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) and
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). In Reitman, the Supreme Court invalidated a California
voter-initiated amendment because it expressly authorized the private right to discriminate against
racial minorities. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 376. Justice Erickson stated the district court erred in
analyzing this case as involving a fundamental right because the equal protection analysis was
based solely on the racial classification. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1293.
In Palmore, the Supreme Court invalidated a child custody order even though the lower court
had determined it would be harmful to a child to remain in a racially mixed household. Palmore,
466 U.S. at 431. The custody order was struck down because it represented invidious racial dis-
crimination. Id. at 433. The dissent argued that Palmore was based on a traditional suspect classi-
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court's fundamental right analysis, Justice Erickson also objected to
the majority's analysis regarding its finding of a fundamental right
to equal political participation. 78 Therefore, the dissent believed
that the preliminary injunction should be discharged. 79
The dissent began its analysis of the fundamental right concept
by recognizing that the United States Supreme Court "has refused
to expand the list of fundamental constitutional rights" beyond
those developed in prior years.380 The dissent pointed out that the
Supreme Court "refused to declare education, housing, welfare pay-
ments, or government employment to be of fundamental constitu-
tional value." 381
The dissent indicated that fundamental rights can be described in
two ways. First, a fundamental right is one " 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist
if [they] were sacrificed.' "82 The second description of fundamen-
tal rights involved liberties "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition.' "38 The dissent acknowledged that under Bowers v.
Hardwick, homosexuals have no fundamental right, under either
formulation, "'to engage in acts of consensual sodomy.' "384 The
dissent concluded its examination of the fundamental right concept
by stating that "[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when [dealing] with judge-made constitutional law hav-
ing [no explicit support] in the language or design of the
Constitution. "385
fication analysis rather than a fundamental right not to have the state endorse private biases, as
found by the district court. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1293 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
378. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1287 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
379. Id.
380. Id. at 1291; see, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (incorporating Fifth
Amendment protection against double jeopardy); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(incorporating Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal prosecution); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and
seizure); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating First Amendment free speech
protection). But see Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (refusing to incorporate grand
jury indictment guarantee of Fifth Amendment). The rights held applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment are also considered fundamental rights for purposes of equal protec-
tion analysis. 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 161, § 18.39.
381. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1291 (Erickson, J., dissenting); see 4 JOHN E. ROTUNDA & RONALD
D. NOWAK. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §11.7, at 393 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing fundamental rights).
382. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1291 (Erickson, J., dissenting) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
383. Id. (quoting Moore v. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
384. Id. at 1291-92 (Erickson, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192
(1986)).
385. Id. at 1292 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194).
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In examining the majority's analysis of Supreme Court decisions,
the dissent found that none of those decisions explicitly identified a
fundamental right to equal political participation.3 8' The dissent
maintained that the cases cited by the majority involved either a
suspect classification, the fundamental right to vote, or candidate
eligibility. 87 Thus, the dissent concluded that the majority erred in
its interpretation that a fundamental right to participate equally in
the political process existed."'
2. Rejection of the Cases Relied on By The Majority to Support
the Fundamental Right
The majority discussed Supreme Court decisions involving reap-
portionment,8 9 direct restrictions on the exercise to vote,39 0 and
"candidate eligibility. 3 91 The dissent claimed that the cases involv-
ing reapportionment and restrictions on voting involved only the
fundamental right to vote and did not create a fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process.3 92 As for the "candidate
eligibility" - or what the dissent termed "ballot access" decisions
- the dissent maintained that the Supreme Court applied only
heightened, not strict judicial scrutiny on the basis of the fundamen-
tal right to vote and the First Amendment right of association.3 93
386. Id. at 1294. The dissent found that the majority's fundamental right analysis was similar
to that of the trial court in that nowhere in the Supreme Court decisions relied on was the funda-
mental right found by the majority and the trial court explicitly identified. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. The dissent admitted that the right to vote included the right to participate in the
electoral process by exercising the franchise, stating that "this Court has made clear that a citizen
has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis." Id. at 1294
n.12 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)). However, the dissent stated that
neither the appellees nor the majority contended that the right to participate in the electoral
process was equivalent to "the much more expansive right" to participate in the political process.
Id. at 1295 n.12.
389. See supra notes 297-306 and accompanying text (relating to the majority's analysis of the
reapportionment cases).
390. See supra notes 286-96 and accompanying text (relating to the majority's discussion of the
cases concerning the right to vote).
391. See supra notes 307-19 and accompanying text (relating to the majority's discussion of
candidate eligibility).
392. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1295 (Erickson, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that even the major-
ity recognized that these cases were distinguishable from the Amendment 2 issue presented in
Evans. Id.
393. Id. at 1296. The dissent admitted that the Supreme Court has minimized the extent to
which voting rights cases were distinguishable from ballot access cases and thus strict scrutiny had
been applied in early decisions. Id. (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992); Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)). However, the dissent maintained that the Supreme Court indi-
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Furthermore, the dissent found that these cases involved entirely
different questions and constitutional issues than Amendment 2. 94
Thus, the dissent concluded, the majority erred in relying on these
cases to support the finding of a fundamental right to equal political
participation and applying strict scrutiny.393
The majority specifically relied on Supreme Court cases concern-
ing legislation which prevented a certain class from enacting desired
legislation through the normal political process.3 96 Specifically, the
majority relied on Hunter v. Erickson,3 97 Washington v. Seattle
School District No. I,398 and Gordon v. Lance. 99 The dissent re-
jected the majority's analysis of these cases as fundamental right
cases and instead found that these cases addressed possible equal
protection violations based on traditional suspect classifications, "al-
beit in situations where the ordinary political process ha[d] been re-
structured."' 00 For example, the dissent explained that the Court in
Hunter characterized the amendment as placing "'special burdens
on racial minorities within the governmental process,' " and further
stated that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented unjustified dis-
tinctions based on race, a constitutionally suspect class deserving a
strict scrutiny standard of review.40 1
The dissent discussed James v. Valtierra0 2 to further support his
disagreement with the majority's reliance on cases concerning legis-
lation preventing a certain class of voters from obtaining desired
cated more recently that strict scrutiny did not apply to ballot access cases. Id. (citing Burdick,
112 S. Ct. at 2060, which involved the application of a balancing test instead of strict scrutiny).
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. See supra notes 319-57 and accompanying text (relating to the majority's discussion of
cases involving voter-initiatives preventing voters from enacting desired legislation).
397. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
398. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
399. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
400. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1297 (Colo.) (Erickson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 419 (1993). To support this proposition, the dissent cited Citizens for Responsible Behavior
v. Superior Court, I Cal. App. 4th 1013 (1991) which asserted that Hunter involved a tradition-
ally suspect class and therefore strict scrutiny was applied. Evans. 854 U.S. at 1297; cf. Robert H.
Beinfield, Note, The Hunter Doctrine: An Equal Protection Theory that Threatens Democracy,
38 VAND. L. REv. 397, 405 (1985) (asserting that strict judicial scrutiny was applied in Hunter
because it involved a racial classification).
401. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1297 (Erickson, J., dissenting) (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391). The
dissent pointed out that other federal cases have addressed Hunter as involving an unconstitu-
tional suspect classification. Id. at 1297 n.14 (citing Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1099 (5th
Cir. 1975); Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710, 718-20 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935
(1971)).
402. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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legislation through normal political processes.40 In Jat;ies, the Su-
preme Court upheld a state constitutional provision requiring any
low-rent housing project to be approved by a majority of the vot-
ers. 44 The dissent in Evans pointed out that this measure "in-
volve[d] legislation which prevented the normal political institutions
and processes from enacting particular legislation desired by an
identifiable group of voters (i.e., poor people who would qualify for
low-rent housing)."'40 5 Therefore, the dissent maintained that ac-
cording to the majority's reading of Hunter, this type of legislation
should be unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny standard be-
cause it singled out the poor - "an identifiable group of voters. ' 40 6
The dissent supported this proposition by referring to the majority's
conclusion that similar to the amendment in Hunter, which singled
out an identifiable group based on race, "Amendment 2 expressly
fence[d] out the identifiable group of gay men, lesbians, and bisexu-
als."40 7 The dissent pointed out that the Supreme Court did not ap-
ply strict scrutiny in James and further distinguished the applica-
tion of strict scrutiny in Hunter on the basis that Hunter involved a
traditionally suspect class. 40 8 Therefore, the dissent explained that
although, in James, an identifiable group was "fenced out" from the
normal political processes, the Supreme Court declined to apply
strict scrutiny, rejecting the assertion that the restructuring of the
political process involved did not violate the equal protection
clause. 09
403. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1297.
404. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). The article approved by the voters in James provided that "no low-
rent housing project should be developed, constructed, or acquired in any manner by a state public
body until the project was approved by a majority of those voting at a community election." Id. at
139.
405. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1297-98 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
406. Id. at 1298. The dissent found that the majority limited application of its fundamental
right to "an identifiable group of voters." Id; see supra note 355 (analyzing the majority's discus-
sion of James).
407. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1298 (Erickson, J., dissenting) (referring to Maj. Op., 854 P.2d at
1285).
408. Id. The dissent cited a reference in James that described Hunter as a case involving a law
which denied equal protection by placing "'special burdens on racial minorities within the govern-
mental process" and that the article in James was unlike Hunter because it made no distinctions
based on race. Id. (quoting James, 402 U.S. at 140-41). Therefore, the James Court declined to
extend Hunter to its case. Id.
409. Id. at 1299 (Erickson, J., dissenting). The appellees in James argued that the mandatory
referendum required by the amendment "hamper[ed] persons desiring public housing from achiev-
ing their objective when no such roadblock face[d] other groups seeking to influence other public
decisions to their advantage." James, 402 U.S. at 142.
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The dissent found that Gordon v. Lance,"10 cited by the majority,
was similar to James.4 The dissent pointed out that the Supreme
Court in Gordon distinguished Hunter on the grounds that Hunter
applied strict scrutiny because it involved a traditionally suspect
class." 2 The legislation in Gordon concerned a requirement for 60%
voter approval for any bonded indebtedness or tax increase incurred
by political subdivisions of the state." 3 The dissent maintained that
as in James, the strict scrutiny standard of review did not apply in
Gordon because the group challenging the measure could not estab-
lish itself as a traditionally suspect class.""' Thus, the dissent con-
cluded that Gordon was best understood, not as a fundamental right
case, but as a case where strict scrutiny did not apply because no
suspect classification was involved." 5 The dissent also limited Wash-
ington v. Seattle School District No. I,46 the third case relied on by
the majority, to a case applying strict scrutiny because a suspect
classification was involved, rather than a fundamental right." 7
Based on its analysis of Hunter and the cases relied on by the
majority, the dissent concluded that the Supreme Court "never fo-
cused on the fundamental right of an independently identifiable
group . . . to participate equally in the political process."" 18 Rather,
the dissent argued that these cases analyzed the legislation at issue
based on whether "special burdens [were placed] on racial minori-
ties within the governmental process.""' 9 The dissent maintained
that strict scrutiny was applied based on the presence of a suspect
classification of which gays were not included. 2" Therefore, the dis-
sent found, "the fact that the regulations at issue in each occurred
410. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
411. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
412. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1299.(Erickson, J., dissenting).
413. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 2-3.
414. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1299 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
415. Id.
416. 458 U.S. 457 (1982); see supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text (discussing Washing-
ton). The dissent relied on language in Washington that the state action burdened racial minori-
ties within the governmental process by explicitly using race to determine the decisionmaking
process. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1300 (Erickson, J., dissenting) (citing Washington, 458 U.S. at 470
which stated that state action "places special burdens on racial minorities within the governmen-
tal process").
417. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1300 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
418. Id.
419. Id. (citing Washington, 458 U.S. at 458; Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5 (1971); Hunter
v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)).
420. Id.
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within the context of the political process was not dispositive."'421
Based on the foregoing analysis, the dissent reiterated its proposi-
tion that the Supreme Court has never explicitly stated that a fun-
damental right to equal political participation exists implicitly
within the Constitution, nor has it found such a fundamental right
directly within the Constitution.422 Therefore, the dissent objected to
the majority's recognition of such a fundamental right and the ap-
plication of strict scrutiny since neither a fundamental right nor a
suspect classification was involved.423 The dissent considered that in
the future, the Supreme Court may agree with the majority's under-
lying legal premise and recognize a fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process. 424 However, the dissent found that
since the Supreme Court has not done so, the majority should take
caution in extrapolating such a right from the cases it relied on to
support its decision.425 Therefore, because Supreme Court precedent
was non-existent regarding a fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process and thus did not support evaluating
Amendment 2 under the strict scrutiny standard of review, Justice
Erickson would reverse and discharge the issuance of the prelimi-
nary injunction, and remand for trial on the permanent
injunction.426
III. ANALYSIS
The development, passage, and denial of enforcement of Amend-
ment 2 involved tremendous controversy and debate between the
supporters and opponents of the amendment, with focus on whether
homosexuality should be a protected lifestyle. The group known as
Colorado for Family Values (CFV) was able to win over a slim ma-
jority of the votes to pass Amendment 2.427 However, the Amend-
ment 2 advocates faced defeat when the Colorado district court,'428
421. Id.




426. Id. at 1302. On October It, 1994, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled the amendment
unconstitutional and issued a permanent injunction enjoining its enforcement. Evans v. Romer,
Nos. 94SA48, 94SA128, 1994 LEXIS 779 (Colo. Oct. 11, 1994).
427. For a discussion on CFV and the development of Amendment 2, see supra notes 45-63
and accompanying text.
428. Evans v. Romer, No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 19678 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 1993).
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followed by the Colorado Supreme Court,2 9 granted a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the amendment's enforcement. Yet, in resolv-
ing the Amendment 2 issue, the Colorado Supreme Court focused
its discussion not on the issue of homosexuality, but rather on the
amendment's infringement on the right to political participation.3 0
Although the case involved homosexuality, the effect of the court's
holding extended to all classes of people.
The court held that the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution protected the fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process, and that any legislation or state con-
stitutional amendment infringing on that right by "fencing out" an
"independently identifiable class of persons" would be subject to
strict judicial scrutiny.431 The amendment infringed on this funda-
mental right as it pertained to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals since it
barred them from having an effective voice in governmental affairs
by preventing them from seeking legislation prohibiting discrimina-
tion based on their sexual orientation;432 yet, the court did not limit
the fundamental right to only homosexuals. 433
A. The Fundamental Right to Political Participation
When the Amendment 2 opponents challenged the initiative in
court, they raised numerous claims ranging from the equal protec-
tion argument decided on by the Evans court, to first amendment
claims, not addressed by the court.434 When the case reached the
Colorado Supreme Court, discussion focused on the plaintiff's claim
that Amendment 2 violated their fundamental right of political par-
ticipation.435 The fundamental right issue came down to one ques-
tion: Whether it was permissible under the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state to take away a particular
429. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993). The Colorado
Supreme court declared the amendment unconstitutional and issued a permanent injunction on
October 11, 1994. Evans v. Romer, Nos. 94SA48, 94SA128, 1994 LEXIS 779 (Colo. Oct. 11,
1994).




434. For a detailed list of the claims raised by the plaintiffs, see supra notes 32-34 and accom-
panying text.
435. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1274. Plaintiff's urged the Colorado Supreme Court to rely only on the
equal protection arguments advanced at the trial level, which included a claim that there existed a
fundamental right to equal participation in the political process. Id.
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group's rights from the political and democratic processes of our
representative government."36 The court answered this question by
finding that this type of discrimination was constitutionally imper-
missible absent a compelling interest justification by the state, a
showing that was not made.""7 The Evans court correctly relied on
prior United States Supreme Court precedent to develop a funda-
mental right to equal political participation.
1. The Right to Equal Political Participation
The right of citizens to participate in the governmental process -
the right to vote, the right to representation in the government, the
right to petition the government for redress of grievances - are
core democratic values recognized under the United States Consti-
tution.438 Although the normal assumption underlying judicial re-
view of legislation is that "even improvident decisions will be recti-
fied by the democratic process, 43 9 thus not warranting judicial
intervention, the courts do not adhere to this assumption when bur-
densome legislation taints the political process itself.44 0 Under these
circumstances, the normal political safeguards may not be able to
protect citizens from oppressive legislation, and the judiciary must
436. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Colorado Bar Association, Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270
(Colo. 1993) (No. 93 SA 017), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993). The effect of the Amendment
made all existing laws, policies, and ordinances prohibiting discrimination based on an individual's
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation unenforceable and unconstitutional. LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 9.
437. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1285 (holding that "Amendment 2 single[d] out and prohibit[ed]
[homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals] from seeking governmental action favorable to [them] and
thus, from participating equally in the political process"). The Evans court stated that because the
defendants did not offer a compelling interest to justify enactment of Amendment 2 under the
strict scrutiny standard, the preliminary injunction remained in effect. Id. at 1286.
438. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 86-87 (1980) (stating that the Constitu-
tion concerns ensuring broad participation in the processes and distributions of government as well
as fairness in settling disputes); Developments in the Law, supra note 194, at 1114 (stating that
Americans have always relied on elections to "implement the fundamental principle that all sover-
eignty vests in the governed"); see, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (finding that
the right to exercise the right to vote "in a free and unimpaired manner [was] preservative of
other basic civil and political rights," and any alleged infringement of that right must be carefully
scrutinized).
439. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
440. Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964). A majority of the people
cannot simply decide to infringe upon a citizen's constitutional rights. Id.; see e.g., Julian N. Eule,
Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990) (stating that while it is a com-
mon belief that the legislature represents the majority's will, the courts will disregard that notion
when the legislature has acted beyond the power delegated to them by the constitution).
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intervene.441 Since Amendment 2 hindered the rights of homosexu-
als, lesbians, and bisexuals to participate in the political process, the
Colorado Supreme Court intervened.
The Evans court reasoned that a fundamental right to equal par-
ticipation in the political process existed by examining case law con-
cerning preconditions on the right to vote, reapportionment, candi-
date eligibility, and legislation which prevented political institutions
and processes from enacting particular legislation desired by a cer-
tain class of voters. 4 2 Although none of these cases explicitly identi-
fied a fundamental right to equal political participation, that such a
right exists becomes evident through the language used and in the
circumstances involved in the prior United States Supreme Court
cases. Combined, these cases demonstrate that the equal protection
clause guarantees the fundamental right to equal participation in
the political process.
2. The Right to Vote
The first line of cases discussed by the Evans court involved the
right to vote.443 In these cases, the Supreme Court consistently
struck down as violating the equal protection clause, legislation
placing preconditions on the exercise of the right to vote.' 4 Al-
though these cases involved the established fundamental right to
vote, they cannot be limited strictly to a "voting" analysis as Justice
Erickson argued in his dissent.445 In fact, the right to vote and the
right to participate equally in the political decision-making process
cannot logically be distinguished. Protecting the right to vote serves
441. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565; see also Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457,
467-70 (1982) (invalidating initiative that suspended the operation of an existing Ohio ordinance
forbidding housing discrimination); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53
n.4 (1936) (determining that prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities" was a special
condition which seriously curtailed the political process relied on to protect minorities and called
for judicial inquiry).
442. See supra text accompanying notes 280-85 (relating to the majority's discussion of these
four categories of cases).
443. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1277 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993); see
supra text accompanying notes 286-96 (relating to the majority's discussion of the cases involving
the right to vote).
444. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating a
restriction which required voters to own property or have children); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating a restriction which required voters to pay a poll tax);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (invalidating a restriction which required the voters to be
civilians).
445. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1295 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
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to ensure effective representative government. 4 6
The basis of these decisions centered on the fact that legislation
"fenced out '"44 7 certain classes of voters by requiring them to fulfill
a condition in order to vote, such as paying a poll tax.448 However,
more than a restriction on voting was at stake. Inhibiting a particu-
lar group's ability to enact legislation in its interest undermines our
system of representative government just as effectively as diluting
the votes of that group.44 9 Through its language in Kramer v. Union
Free School District No. 1,4 0 the Court demonstrated that these
voting cases extend protection to a fundamental right to equal politi-
cal participation.
The Court in Kramer held that statutes which selectively grant
the right to vote "always pose the danger of denying some citizens
any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially
affect their lives." 45 Thus, the legislation infringed on a fundamen-
tal right to equal political participation since it impaired a group's
ability to effectively participate in the governmental process. The
Court similarly recognized this fundamental right in Dunn v. Blum-
stein452 by illustrating that when states deny some citizens the right
to vote, those citizens are essentially deprived of a " 'a fundamental
political right . . . preservative of all rights.' -53 It is anomalous to
argue that there can be no prohibition on the right of a particular
group of citizens to vote for state and local legislators who enact
legislation to protect them from discrimination, yet those elected
446. See Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626 ("Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may
participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of
representative government."); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-66 (1964) (delineating the
one-man-one-vote rule).
447. Carrington, 380 U.S. at 94 (finding that "'[fQencing out' from the franchise a sector of
the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible").
448. Harper, 383 U.S. at 680.
449. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969) (finding that "the State may no more
disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf
than it may dilute any person's vote").
450. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626-27 ("Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may
participate in political affairs . . . undermines the legitimacy of representative government. ...
Statutes granting the [right to vote] to residents on a selective basis always pose the danger of
denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect
their lives.").
451. Id. at 627.
452. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
453. Id. at 336 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)). In Dunn, the Court
struck down durational residency requirements imposed by the states as a precondition to voting.
Id. at 360.
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legislators can be deprived of their power to enact such legisla-
tion.454 The cases involving preconditions on the right to vote in-
volved a fundamental right to equal political participation by main-
taining an equal opportunity for citizens to effectively voice their
opinions in affairs directly affecting them.
3. Reapportionment
The second line of cases discussed by the Evans court in their
analysis of a fundamental right to equal political participation con-
cerned reapportionment. 55 These cases are analogous to the precon-
dition on voting cases in that some citizens were denied the right to
vote in a free and unimpaired manner by having their votes diluted
in the political process.456 The argument proposed by the dissent
that the reapportionment cases, like the restrictions on voting deci-
sions, are limited to an analysis regarding the fundamental right to
vote and not to a fundamental right to political participation, can be
easily discarded for similar reasons discussed earlier.457
The right to equal participation in the political process is so essen-
tial to effective representative government that any measures which
restrict a group's ability to bring about change through the ordinary
political processes are highly suspect under the equal protection
clause.458 The reapportionment cases encompass a fundamental
right to equal political participation on the basis that dilution of the
vote violates the equal protection clause.45 9 For example, in Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 460 the Court noted that no one was precluded, or even
454. Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Preliminary Injunction Motion at 13, Evans v.
Romer, 1993 WL 19678 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 1993) (No. 92 CV 7223), affid on other
grounds, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
455. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1277-78 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
456. Equal protection requires that voters exercise the right to vote on an even footing with
others. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963) ("The concept of 'we the people' under
the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the
basic qualifications."). Under the equal protection clause, "the overriding objective must be sub-
stantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is ap-
proximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State." Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 358-71 (discussing these reasons).
458. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565; see Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457,
467-70 (1982) (discussing the equal protection clause guarantee of racial minorities' right to full
participation in the political life of the community); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1936) (determining that prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities"
was a special condition which seriously curtailed the political process relied on to protect minori-
ties and called for judicial inquiry).
459. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
460. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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impeded, from voting.461 Rather, at issue was the right to have one's
vote count as the same as the votes of others, thus reflecting that the
Constitution insures not simply the right to vote and participate in
the governmental process, but the right to do so in a meaningful and
effective manner. "62 This proposition can be analogized to cases re-
garding candidate eligibility, discussed in the next section.
4. Candidate Eligibility
The requirement that voters be able to exercise the right to vote
on an equal basis with others is also applied in the context of cases
regarding candidate eligibility, the third group of cases relied on by
the Evans court.46 3 These cases involve more than a fundamental
right to vote and a First Amendment right to association, as the
dissent argued.46 4 The Court's analysis in such cases reflects a fun-
damental right to equal political participation by recognizing that
statutes which make it virtually impossible for new political parties
with widespread support, or an old party with little support, to be
placed on the state ballot significantly burden a voter's right to cast
their vote effectively.466 Thus, the right to equal participation in the
political process involves the right of an individual of a minority
party to be placed on the ballot and the right of the voter to enjoy
exercising the right to vote based on an equal opportunity ballot.
Although the candidate eligibility cases as well as the restriction
on voting and reapportionment cases provide reasoning and lan-
guage demonstrating a fundamental right to equal participation in
the political process, admittedly, they are not dispositive of or di-
rectly controlling on the issue of whether such a fundamental right
actually exists. 466 The issue becomes more complicated when the
voter's themselves pass a state constitutional amendment preventing
the normal political institutions and processes from enacting partic-
461. Id. at 537-38.
462. "[Elach and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the
political processes . I..." Id  at 565.
463. See supra notes 307-18 and accompanying text (discussing candidate eligibility).
464. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1296 (Colo.) (Erickson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 419 (1993).
465. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). The vote lost effectiveness because a "vote may
be cast only for one of two parties at a time when other parties are clamoring for a place on the
ballot." Id. at 31.
466. The Evans court stated that the " 'precondition', reapportionment, and 'candidate eligibil-
ity' cases are not dispositive of, or directly controlling on, our decision here, as Amendment 2 falls
within none of those three categories of cases." Evans, 854 P.2d at 1278.
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ular legislation, such as what occurred with Amendment 2. How-
ever, when these three categories of cases are combined with Su-
preme Court cases concerning legislation effecting a particular
group similar to how Amendment 2 effected gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals, the recognition of a fundamental right to participate on
an equal basis in the political process gains prominence. The Evans
court relied on this fourth and last type of case to fully support its
view that such a fundamental right exists.467 This fourth category of
cases is discussed in the following section.
5. Voter Initiatives Preventing Enactment of Particular
Legislation
Cases concerning voter initiated amendments preventing a politi-
cal institution from enacting a certain type of legislation, most
closely analogize the Amendment 2 issue and provide a convincing
basis for declaring that a fundamental right to equal political partic-
ipation exists. The Supreme Court held such voter initiated amend-
ments or measures invalid under the equal protection clause because
they placed special burdens on a class of persons 48 and interfered
with the political process.469 Such legislation burdened the right to
participate in the political process because it prevented the normal
political institutions from acting on legislation desired by a particu-
lar group of voters. 470 By withdrawing the power of the legislature
or other political institution to vote on issues of special importance
to a certain group of voters, such laws hinder that group's ability to
cast a meaningful vote.
The state does not violate any fundamental right of political par-
ticipation when it restructures the political process evenhandedly,
making it more difficult for anyone to seek a certain type of govern-
mental action.4 71 However, because the right to equal participation
467. Id. at 1279-84.
468. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969) (holding that the amendment violated
equal protection because it "place[d] special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental
process").
469. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (holding that voter
initiative interfered with the political process because it restricted minority group's ability to se-
cure public benefits).
470. Id.
471. Washington, 458 U.S. at 467-70 (holding that a statute which allowed busing of children
to schools outside the child's geographic area for non-racial reasons, but not for racial reasons,
violated the equal protection clause); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (holding that West
Virginia's 60% voter approval requirement for political subdivisions to avoid increased tax rates
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in the political process is intertwined with the existence of an effec-
tive representative government, measures that restrict any group's
ability to bring about change through the usual political processes
are highly suspect under the equal protection clause.1 2 Even if indi-
viduals in the group can elect their local or state legislators, their
vote is less meaningful if the legislative body is prevented from act-
ing on the issues important to that group of voters. As the court
noted in Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court,"3
when a law removes the power of the normal political institutions
"to grant redress of the subject grievance," then "the right [to peti-
tion the government] becomes a hollow exercise. 474
Creating such an anomaly and bias against a particular group in
the political process, therefore, violates the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, in Hunter v. Erick-
son,475 the Court held that "the State may no more disadvantage
any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation
on its behalf than it may dilute any person's vote or give any group
smaller representation than another of comparable size."' 476 While
there was no constitutional mandate requiring the city to prohibit
private discrimination by enacting a fair housing ordinance, the city
could not prevent a certain group from encouraging the city council
to enact such an ordinance. Hunter held that such an encumbrance
to the particular group's political participation was subject to strict
scrutiny.' 77
Relying on the equal protection principles announced in Hunter,
the Supreme Court in Washington v. Seattle School District No.
1478 accentuated the principle that laws which integrate bias into the
or bonded indebtedness did not violate the equal protection clause because the requirement did not
discriminate against or authorize discrimination against an identifiable class).
472. See supra notes 319-57 and accompanying text (discussing voter-initiatives preventing en-
actment of desired legislation).
473. 1 Cal. App. 4th 1013 (1991); see supra note 114 (discussing this case).
474. Citizens for Responsible Behavior, I Cal. App. 4th at 1027 n.9.
475. 393 U.S. 385 (1969); see supra notes 214-21 and accompanying text (discussing Hunter).
476. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added); cf Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474
(1968) (holding the constitution "permits no substantial variation from equal population in draw-
ing districts for units of local government having general government powers over entire geo-
graphic area served by such body"); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down Ala-
bama's plan for apportionment of seats in the two houses of the Alabama legislature because the
apportionment was not based on population).
477. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392.
478. 450 U.S. 457 (1982); see supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text (discussing
Washington).
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political structure or allocation of political power, thus burdening
the ability of certain minorities to achieve beneficial legislation, are
just as impermissible as denying those minority groups the right to
vote.479 The Hunter amendment removed the city council's power to
eliminate housing discrimination and transferred it to the city elec-
torate,480 and the Washington initiative shifted the authority to rem-
edy racial segregation in the schools from the school district to the
state voters.481 In both cases, access to the normal political process
was limited for a particular group, in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause.
Reitman v. Mulkey482 presented another situation in which a
state constitutional amendment extracted a minority issue from con-
sideration in the normal political process in violation of the equal
protection clause. The effect of the amendment in Reitman, which
protected property owners' right to discriminate in the sale or rental
of their property,48 3 was to repeal existing legislation prohibiting
housing discrimination based on race and to prevent similar mea-
sures from passing in the future. The Court held that the amend-
ment violated the equal protection clause because it made "[t]he
right to discriminate . . . on racial grounds . . . immune from legis-
lative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level of the state gov-
ernment."48 4 The effect of Amendment 2 had the same conse-
quences except that the right to discriminate pertained to
homosexuality rather than race. Nevertheless, it is evident that the
Court recognized that this type of legislation interferes with the fun-
damental right to participate in the political process on an equal
basis since it bars a particular group from enacting beneficial legis-
lation to protect itself from discrimination.
Overall, the cases concerning the preconditions on voting, reap-
portionment, candidate eligibility, and legislation which prevents
certain voters from enacting desired legislation, combine to establish
the existence of a fundamental right to equal political participation.
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized such a
fundamental right and has demonstrated reluctance in expanding
479. Washington, 450 U.S. at 470.
480. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387.
481. Washington, 450 U.S. at 463.
482. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
483. Id. at 370; see supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text (discussing Reitman).
484. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 377.
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the list of fundamental rights beyond those already defined,4 85 the
right exists within Court precedent. It appears that the Court has
all but declared such a fundamental right to exist.""6 Since the
United States Supreme Court chose not to take the case, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court's decision stands and thus, there is a funda-
mental right to participate on an equal basis in the political process.
B. Protective Legislation Not Limited to Suspect Classes
Although Hunter, Washington, and Reitman all involved schemes
which inhibited a group's ability to procure protective legislation on
the basis of race, the principle articulated in the cases clearly was
not one that can logically be limited to the "race" context alone."8 7
Furthermore, the right of equal political participation applies be-
yond the suspect classifications to a broader range of
discrimination. 8
Cases concerning political participation do not depend upon the
presence of any "suspect" or "protected" class. Rather, the focus is
on the participation itself; this is what is protected against discrimi-
nation by requiring a standard of strict judicial scrutiny overcome
only by a compelling interest.48 9 The Supreme Court has continu-
ously emphasized in its case law that the right of meaningful politi-
cal participation is a core democratic value supporting other rights
and, as such, deserves the strongest possible constitutional
protection .49
485. See supra note 157 (detailing list of cases establishing existing fundamental rights); see
also supra text accompanying note 158 (discussing the Supreme Court's reluctance to expand the
list).
486. "[E]ach and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the
political processes of [their] State's legislative bodies." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565
(1964).
487. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1281-84 (Colo.) (arguing successfully this position),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993); see supra notes 331-42 and accompanying text (relating to
the majority's discussion that these cases were not limited to race).
488. The Supreme Court has recognized three classifications as suspect: race, national origin,
and ancestry. Illegitimacy and gender are deemed "quasi-suspect" classifications. For further dis-
cussion on suspect classifications, see supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
489. See TRIBE, supra note 151, §13-10, at 1085 (stating that equal protection "ordinarily ...
requires that a franchise restriction be shown necessary to serve a compelling state interest").
490. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 ("[Slince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringe-
ment of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."); Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ("No right is more precious in a free country than that of
having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which . . . we must live. Other
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.").
906 [Vol. 44:841
1995] COLORADO'S AMENDMENT TWO DEFEATED 907
Many of the first voting rights cases did not involve discrimina-
tion against any suspect class at all,491 but rather involved discrimi-
nation against non-suspect groups such as non-property owners,
4 92
military personnel,493 and urban residents.494 The Court invalidated
the state laws at issue in those cases not because they discriminated
against a racial group or other suspect class, but because they re-
stricted the ability of a certain group to further its interests by dilut-
ing or inhibiting that group's right to vote.49 5 Hunter supports this
proposition.
Recall that Hunter involved a charter amendment passed by the
voters of Akron, Ohio, requiring a majority vote to approve fair
housing legislation, whereas other municipal ordinances could be ap-
proved by the city council.496 The Supreme Court held that the
amendment deprived minority groups of equal protection because it
"place[d] special burdens on racial minorities within the govern-
mental process. 497 In reaching that conclusion, the Court obviously
was concerned with the fact that the amendment was aimed at mi-
nority racial groups. However, the Court's opinion articulated a
broader concept.
In particular, the Hunter court stated that the state may not dis-
criminate against "any particular group by making it more difficult
to enact legislation in its behalf [any more] than it may dilute any
person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than an-
other of comparable size."498 It is significant that the Court cited
Reynolds v. Sims499 and Avery v. Midland County500 to support this
proposition because those cases did not involve a suspect classifica-
tion.5 0 ' Therefore, Hunter expressly extended its principle to cases
that did not involve race or any other suspect class; a state could not
491. See supra notes 147-54 (listing the traditionally recognized suspect classifications).
492. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 631 (1969).
493. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
494. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484-86 (1968) (noting that "the powers of the
Commissioners Court include the authority to make a substantial number of decisions that affect
all citizens, whether they reside inside or outside the city limits"); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568 ("A
citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because he lives in the city or on the farm.").
495. See supra notes 169-89 and accompanying text (discussing voting cases generally).
496. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 387 (1969).
497. Id. at 391.
498. Id. at 392-93 (emphasis added) (quoted later in Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
458 U.S. 457, 468 (1982)).
499. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
500. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
501. The schemes in Reynolds and Avery involved the classification of urban residents.
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burden any particular group's ability to enact legislation in its
behalf.50 2
The Court invalidated a similar measure thirteen years later, in
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.01 The Court relied on
Hunter to hold that the voters wrongfully interfered with the politi-
cal process and unlawfully oppressed the efforts of minority groups
to secure public benefits by denying the minorities the right to ob-
tain racial integration through a remedy enacted by the district
school boards, the entity that administered practically all local
school programs.50 4
In reaching this holding, the majority in Washington did not
merely follow Hunter, but specifically addressed and adhered to Jus-
tice Harlan's "neutral principles" formulation pronounced in Hunter
as the "central principle." 5 5 In particular, the Court noted that
laws would not be found unconstitutional just because they war-
ranted general requirements affecting the legislative process, even if
they burdened minority groups' ability "to achieve favorable legisla-
tion."5 It was the fact that these "laws make it more difficult for
every group in the community to enact comparable laws, they
provid[e] a just framework within which the diverse political groups
in our society may fairly compete." 501 The initiatives in both Hunter
and Washington, on the other hand, did not attempt "to allocate
governmental power on the basis of any general principle," but,
rather, unlawfully burdened the rights of a particular group. 508 The
state did not neutrally allocate its power, making such a structuring
of the political process as prohibitive as denying equal voting
502. It is noteworthy that of the two Justices who dissented in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967), Justices Harlan and Stewart, concurred separately to the majority opinion in Hunter.
See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1280 (Colo.) (noting this fact), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 419
(1993). After recognizing their dissent in Reitman, they observed that, in contrast to the initiative
in Reitman, "the City of Akron ha[d] not attempted to allocate governmental power on the basis
of any general principle." Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 395 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Rather, the Akron voters acted with the "clear purpose of making it more difficult for certain
racial and religious minorities to achieve legislation that [was] in their interest." Id. Justices
Harlan and Stewart concluded that this was constitutionally impermissible. Id. at 395-96.
503. 458 U.S. 457 (1982); see supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text (discussing
Washington).
504. Washington, 458 U.S. at 467-70 (developing the principle that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to full participation in the political life
of the community).
505. Id. at 469-70.
506. Id. at 470 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 394 (Harlan, J. concurring)).
507. Id. (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393 (Harlan, J. concurring)).
508. Id. (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 395 (Harlan, J. concurring)).
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rights. 50 9 The Washington Court's reliance on the "general princi-
ple" underlying Harlan's analysis in Hunter signifies the Court's ex-
tension of Hunter and Washington to constitutional principles be-
yond suspect classifications.
That political participation cases do not depend upon the presence
of any "suspect" or "protected" classes is also evident in Gordon v.
Lance. 1 ' In upholding a West Virginia statute, the Court responded
to the proposition that the requirement in Gordon diluted voting
power, and reaffirmed the principle that "an individual may not be
denied access to the ballot because of some extraneous condition,
such as race, wealth, tax status, or military status."' 51 ' However, the
Court distinguished Hunter based on the effect of the measures at
issue: in Gordon, the statute applied equally to all bond issues for
any purpose, while in Hunter, the ordinance subjected "fair housing
legislation alone . . . to an automatic referendum requirement. 51 2
Furthermore, in Hunter, an identifiable class was singled out,
whereas the Gordon Court could "discern no independently identifi-
able group or category that favor[ed] bonded indebtedness over
other forms of financing. Consequently no sector of the population
[would] be 'fenced out' from the franchise because of the way they
[would] vote."51 3
The Court in Gordon further supported the right of equal protec-
tion in the political process by indicating that although the West
Virginia statute did not restrict any group's right to vote, it hindered
the ability to take certain governmental action.5"4 The Court con-
cluded that "so long as such provisions [did] not discriminate
against or authorize discrimination against any identifiable class
they [did] not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 515
The Gordon Court's discussion of Hunter is significant in two re-
spects. First, the fact that the Court mentioned Hunter at all is con-
siderable because the issue in Gordon did not involve race or any
other suspect class.516 Second, although the Court acknowledged
509. Id.
510. 403 U.S. 1 (1971); see supra notes 343-53 and accompanying text (discussing Gordon).
511. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5.
512. Id. (emphasis added).
513. Id. (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965)).
514. Id. at 5-6.
515. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
516. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Colorado Bar Association at 18, Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d
1270 (Colo.) (No. 93SA17), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
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that the ordinance in Hunter "singled out" "those who would bene-
fit from laws barring racial, religious or ancestral discrimina-
tions," 517 the Court did not address the racial aspect or identity of
the particular class discriminated against in Hunter as a distinguish-
ing factor in its analysis. Instead, the Gordon Court considered im-
portant the fact that there was an identifiable class, whatever its
nature.518 For example, the Court suggested that it would have in-
validated the statute if there was some "independently identifiable
group" that "favor[ed] bonded indebtedness,"5 9 thus implying that
constitutional analysis focuses on whether there is discrimination
against a particular group, not whether the specific group discrimi-
nated against was entitled to protection because of its status as a
suspect, class.52°
Both Gordon and Washington establish the fact that Hunter is
not a case limited in application to race. By recognizing this fact,
Washington proves its own analysis to extend beyond race. These
cases articulate the vital importance of political participation in our
democratic society and the right to do so on an equal basis. These
cases involve race, but the underlying theme in the holding concerns
the development of a fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process. Not just participation, but effective and meaning-
ful participation, is a constitutional value deserving independent
protection. When a particular group is singled out, regardless of
whether or not it is considered a suspect class, meaningful political
participation is impeded, causing an impermissible violation of the
equal protection clause. The Constitution extends beyond protecting
a group of individuals; it ensures that the value of effective partici-
pation is not undermined.
Overall, it is evident that the cases relied on by the majority sup-
port the existence of a fundamental right to political participation
on an equal basis.52' Within the fundamental right to vote lies the
concept that the political process cannot be inhibited under any cir-
cumstances. The cases involving candidate eligibility illustrate that
the right to have equal access to the ballot encompasses values un-
517. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5 (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)).
518. Id. at 7.
519. Id. at 5.
520. See id. at 7; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Colorado Bar Association at 18, Evans (No.
93SA 17).
521. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1285 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
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derlying the democratic process. 22 The reapportionment cases
demonstrate the paramount importance of political participation as
one's vote cannot be diluted and every person's vote must count
equally.523 Voter-initiated measures which prevent a certain class of
voters from enacting desired legislation are held invalid on the basis
that they prevent the group of voters from obtaining effective and
meaningful participation in the political process.524 Thus, for pur-
poses of equal political participation, it is irrelevant whether the
group involved is a "suspect class." The issue turns on one's ability
to participate in the governmental process. The Evans court only
reiterated, in a direct manner, what the U.S. Supreme Court has
previously identified - namely, a fundamental right to participate
on an equal basis in the political process.
IV. IMPACT
The Colorado Supreme Court declared in Evans v. Romer5 2 5 that
there is a fundamental right to participate on an equal basis in the
political process. Although the case was decided with regard to the
infringement of this right for homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals,
the court's holding extends to all classes of people. Thus, the obvious
impact of the court's holding is that the fundamental rights "list" is
extended to include the right to equal political participation for
everyone.
The United States Supreme Court has demonstrated resistance to
expanding what it considers to qualify as a fundamental right.526
The Court had the opportunity to uphold that pattern of resistance
when Amendment 2 supporters appealed Evans to the Court;
62 7
however, the Court declined to review the case. Thus, the Colorado
Supreme Court's explicit recognition of this fundamental right
stands as is. The Colorado court's analysis has already been recog-
nized by the United States District Court in Equality Foundation
522. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
523. For a discussion of the reapportionment cases, see supra notes 197-211 and accompanying
text.
524. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 212-34 and accompanying text.
525. 854 P.2d at 1270.
526. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (referring to Supreme Court's reluctance to
expand the fundamental rights list); see also supra note 157 (listing the fundamental rights).
527. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on November 1, 1993. Romer v. Evans, 114 S.
Ct. 419 (1993).
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of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati.528
In this case, the court granted a preliminary injunction to prevent
the enforcement of a voter initiated amendment that mirrored the
one in Colorado.529 On November 2, 1993, the voters in Cincinnati
passed an amendment to the Cincinnati charter that prohibited the
city and its various boards and commissions from enacting, adopt-
ing, enforcing, or administering any ordinance, regulation, rule, or
policy which provided that homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexuals, were
entitled to or had a claim of minority or protected status, quota
preference or other preferential treatment. 3 Any existing provision
that contradicted this amendment was deemed null and void by the
amendment. 31 Plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that the
amendment infringed on their fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process.53 ' Although the court demonstrated
reluctance in finding that such a fundamental right existed, the
court concluded that there was a "strong likelihood that such [a]
right exists, and that the Defendant has violated it."15 33 The United
States district court relied on the Colorado Supreme Court's analy-
sis in Evans.53 4 Thus, the court recognized that "all people have the
right to be free from restrictions which would 'pose the danger of
denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs
which would substantially affect their lives.' "535
The district court further upheld the proposition that the holdings
in Hunter and Gordon are not limited to cases involving racial dis-
crimination.53 6 Rather, the court concluded that those cases "stand
for the broader proposition that states may not disadvantage any
identifiable group, whether a suspect category or not, by making it
more difficult to enact legislation on its behalf." ' 7 Thus, another
impact of the Evans holding is its recognition of extending cases
such as Hunter beyond an analysis based solely on a suspect classifi-
cation. These cases instead identify, although not expressly stated, a
fundamental right to equal political participation.
528. 838 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
529. Id. at 1243.
530. Id. at 1236.
531. Id.
532. Id. at 1238.
533. Id.
534. Id.
535. Id. at 1239 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)).
536. Id. at 1241.
537. Id.
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The effect such a right has on the political process enables politi-
cal institutions to maintain their ability to enact protective legisla-
tion when necessary without fear of religiously or otherwise moti-
vated, voter initiatives draining them of their power. For example,
there was existing legislation in Colorado which prevented discrimi-
nation based on an individual's sexual orientation in public accom-
modations, employment, and education. 3 8 When Colorado for Fam-
ily Values campaigned against such legislation, motivated by
religious reasons, 539 it successfully convinced voters to pass Amend-
ment 2. If enacted, Amendment 2 would make all the pre-existing
legislation prohibiting such discrimination unenforceable and uncon-
stitutional. 40 Thus, Amendment 2 did not merely burden gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals right's to political participation, it effectively
abrogated those rights in the context of protective legislation.
By repealing a number of laws and ordinances previously enacted
for the benefit of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals, Amendment 2
effectively removed this combined group of individuals from the po-
litical structure of the State of Colorado and rendered them politi-
cally powerless with regard to protection of their rights and inter-
ests. Without the legislation prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation, the only redress for homosexuals, lesbians, and
bisexuals was a constitutional amendment, basically repealing
Amendment 2. Since Amendment 2 itself was a constitutional
amendment passed by a majority vote, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
basically had no means of preventing others from discriminating
against them. By recognizing that such a voter-initiated amendment
encumbers homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals access to the politi-
cal process, the Evans court found that there is a fundamental right
to political participation on an equal basis.54 This fundamental
right thus protects existing legislation from injurious attack.
By protecting existing anti-discrimination laws and policies, the
recognition of such a fundamental right also furthers gay rights in
that it allows homosexuals to have not merely a voice in govern-
ment, but an effective voice. Further, existing legislation which pro-
vides homosexuals equal access to necessities, such as housing and
538. See supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text (discussing the legislation).
539. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text (discussing CFV's purposes underlying its
development of Amendment 2).
540. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL. supra note 29, at 9.
541. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
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employment, by prohibiting discrimination, enables homosexuals to
feel somewhat relieved in knowing that the law does not exclude
them from deserving the same opportunities as everyone else.
The fundamental right thus far has only received recognition in
the area of legislation concerning homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexu-
als. However, a fundamental right to equal political participation
does exist and has been explicitly adopted by the Colorado Supreme
Court and the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio as well as implicitly adopted by the United States Su-
preme Court through case precedent. The impact of such a funda-
mental right may increase as more "Amendment 2" issues arise.
CONCLUSION
The Colorado Supreme Court in Evans v. Romer boldly declared
that there exists a fundamental right to equal participation in the
political process. Although such a right has not explicitly been iden-
tified or recognized by the United States Supreme Court, prior case
law concerning preconditions on the right to vote, reapportionment,
candidate eligibility, and voter initiated amendments preventing en-
actment of a particular type of legislation, combine to demonstrate
that such a right is embraced in these types of cases and can be
extrapolated from them without upsetting the majoritarian and po-
litical system enveloped in our government.
Through the cases concerning preconditions on the right to vote,
the Supreme Court has expressed a view that the ability to have
one's voice expressed freely and uninhibited is of paramount impor-
tance in our democratic society. The reapportionment cases uphold
the same principle, extending it one step further by invalidating any
scheme which dilutes a person's or group's vote, thus reinforcing the
idea that everyone's vote must count equally. The cases regarding
candidate eligibility go to the heart of our system of government by
safeguarding equal access to the ballot for minority parties and fur-
thering the importance of political participation by providing un-
restricted choice for voters. Cases involving voter-initiatives prevent-
ing a certain group from enacting desired legislation most closely
resemble the Amendment 2 issue. These types of cases are injurious
not only to the. group of voters who are shut off from the political
process due to the measure, but also to the democratic process itself
as the normal political institutions are prevented from enacting leg-
islation beneficial to society.
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All these categories of cases combined demonstrate the essential
value equal political participation holds in our society. It is the right
to participate for everyone that must be protected, not just those
who are deemed to qualify as a "suspect class." Therefore, it may
be said that the United States Supreme Court, as well as society as
a whole, have already adopted the principle that the Colorado Su-
preme Court explicitly identified, that there is a fundamental right
for all to participate on an equal basis in the political process.
Stephanie L. Grauerholz

